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A COMPARISON OF FARM BANKRUPTCIES IN
CHAPTER 11 AND THE NEW CHAPTER 12
Janet A. Flaccus *
No one can doubt that many farmers are in severe financial
straits. Falling land values, reduced farm exports, low commodity
prices, recent high interest rates and extensive debt have made it in-
creasingly difficult for many of them to continue to farm. A number
of farmers are drifting toward insolvency. For example, in 1984
17.7% of all farms and 21.8% of cash grain farms had debts equal to
40% or more of assets.' In 1985 the percentage of all farms with a
40% or more debt-equity ratio had climbed from 17.7% to 18.9%,
and the percentage of cash grain farms with a 40% or more debt-
equity ratio had climbed from 21.8% to 24.3%.2 Of these, the farms
with a debt-equity ratio over 70% climbed from 6% of all farms in
1984 to 7.3% in 1985.3 For cash grain farms the increase was from
7.6% to 10%.' In addition, in 1985, 3% of all farms were insolvent,
their debts exceeded assets. 5 A farm with a 70% debt-equity ratio is
likely to be facing insolvency and reorganization or liquidation; a
farm with a 40% debt load is facing serious financial problems.
Nor is anyone predicting that the farm financial crisis is going to
end in the near future. Farmland values continued to decline in
1987.6 Although commodity prices are up in 1988, many farms are
experiencing drought conditions which will reduce yields. As a re-
sult, many farmers are liquidating the farm enterprise in and outside
of bankruptcy. Many of these liquidations are not out of choice but
out of necessity; in part because few farmers have been able to con-
tinue to farm and rehabilitate the farm enterprise under Chapters 11
* Janet A. Flaccus, Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; B.A. Wheaton
College, 1971; M.A. University of California, Davis, 1973; J.D. University of California, Da-
vis, 1978; L.L.M., University of Illinois, 1985.
1. Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms, January 1985, Agriculture Information Bulle-
tin No. 495, 10 (available from the Economic Research Service division of the United States
Department of Agriculture).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Lenders' Farm-Land Holdings Continue to Rise, Arguing More Price Declines, Wall St.
J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
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and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Before the recent legislation, Chap-
ters 11 and 13 were the only bankruptcy chapters designed to allow a
business to continue to operate while it readjusted its debts. Liquida-
tion of the enterprise was not involved as long as the debtor was able
to get a confirmed plan under which to operate the business. How-
ever, getting a plan confirmed in Chapter 11 and meeting the require-
ments of being a debtor in Chapter 13 have been difficult, if not
impossible, for many farmers.
Chapter 13, which allows individuals a chance to restructure
their debts, has not been helpful for a number of farmers because of
the restrictions on who can be a debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding. A
Chapter 13 debtor can have no more than $100,000 in liquidated,
noncontingent, unsecured indebtedness and no more than $350,000 in
liquidated, noncontingent, secured indebtedness.7 These debt restric-
tions tend to exclude distressed farmers. In addition, the Chapter 13
debtor must be an individual; partnerships and corporations are ex-
cluded.8 Thus, even if the debt level of the farmer qualified for a
Chapter 13, if the farmer did business in a partnership or corporate
form, he or she could not file a Chapter 13 petition.
However, if a farmer's situation meets the Chapter 13 limita-
tions, the farmer should consider a Chapter 13 filing. This is espe-
cially true if the farmer has debts that fall under section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code.9 Although section 523 makes certain debts nondis-
chargeable, a Chapter 13 debtor who completes the payments is dis-
charged from all section 523 debts except alimony and child support
claims. 1° This is not true of a Chapter 12 discharge. 1
There are no similar debt or business structure limitations on a
Chapter 11 debtor. 12 Most farmers wishing to keep the farm filed
under Chapter 11, but few farmers made it through this chapter suc-
cessfully. The lack of success with Chapter 11 has numerous causes
and will be discussed below.
On October 27, 1986, the President signed a bill creating a new
bankruptcy chapter, Chapter 12.13 Chapter 12 is designed to make it
easier for farmers to use bankruptcy to keep the farm and restructure
7. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 523 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Id. § 1328(a) (1982).
11. Id. § 1228(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
12. Id. § 109(d) (Supp. III 1985).
13. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
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their debt. Congress modeled Chapter 12 after Chapter 13 and added
some Chapter 11 concepts. The following analysis compares Chapter
11 with Chapter 12. It focuses on the aspects of a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding that make it difficult for farmers to successfully reorganize.
Chapter 12 is analyzed to assess the changes it will make on farm
bankruptcies, especially in light of the problems Chapter 11 created
for farmers.
I. WHO CAN FILE
Anyone in business may file in Chapter 11. " Only certain farm-
ers may file in Chapter 12.15 Chapter 12 is not limited to individuals
as is Chapter 13. Individuals, corporations, or partnerships may file a
Chapter 12 petition. 6 If the farmer is an individual or an individual
and spouse, their aggregate debts cannot exceed $1,500,000.11 Eighty
percent of the noncontingent, liquidated debts must have arisen from
a farm operation owned by the individual or the individual and his or
her spouse."8 However, the eighty percent requirement does not in-
clude any debts on the farmer's residence unless the debts arose out of
the farming operation. 9 In addition, for the taxable year preceding
the bankruptcy filing, the individual, or individual and spouse, must
have received more than fifty percent of their gross income from the
farm operation.2 °
The part of the Chapter 12 definition that may cause problems
14. In fact, the language of the statute, 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (Supp. III 1985) does not limit
the Chapter 11 debtor to businesses. However, three United States Courts of Appeals have
limited Chapter 11 to businesses. Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co., (In
re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1986); Wamsganz v. Boatmen's Bank
of DeSoto, 804 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136,
1137 (6th Cir. 1985). Contra In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1985).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (Supp. IV 1986) limits Chapter 12 to family farmers. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(17) (Supp. IV 1986) defines who is a family farmer.
16. Id. § 101(17).
17. Id. § 101(17)(A). See, e.g., In re Baldwin Farms, 78 Bankr. 143 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987); In re Budde, 79 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); In re Carpenter, 79 Bankr. 316
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Stedman,
72 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g., In re Douglass, 77 Bankr. 714
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Roberts, 78 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
20. Id. § 101(17)(A). See, e.g., In re Faber, 78 Bankr. 934 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987); Fed-
eral Land Bank of Columbia v. McNeal, 77 Bankr. 315 (S.D. Ga. 1987); In re Guinnane, 73
Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Maike, 77 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re
McKillips, 72 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1987); In re Shepherd, 75 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Wolline, 74 Bankr.
208 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
for the farmer is the requirement that more than fifty percent of the
farmer and spouse's income in the year preceding the year of the
bankruptcy filing, must have come from farming. It is important to
note that Chapter 12 income is gross income. Usually, the spouse of a
farmer will be a cosigner on the farm debt. Therefore, the spouse will
also need to be in bankruptcy, so that their gross income will be added
for the fifty percent test.21
A corporation or partnership may file a Chapter 12 petition if at
least fifty percent of the outstanding stock or equity is owned by one
family or by the one family and its relatives. 22 The family or the rela-
tives must conduct the farm operation.23 In addition, more than
eighty percent of the value of the corporation or partnership's assets
must relate to the farm operation,24 and the aggregate debts cannot
exceed $1,500,000.25 Eighty percent or more of the corporation or
partnership's noncontingent, liquidated debts must arise out of the
farm operation, but the eighty percent does not include a debt owed
on the principal residence unless the debt arose out of the farm
operation.26
A problem with this part of the definition could arise under the
following fact pattern. Assume that the husband of a family along
with his brothers runs a farm as a partnership. The wives have non-
farm jobs. Lenders have required the wives to cosign the farm debt.
Now the partnership wants to enter Chapter 12. If the partnership
meets the assets and debt limits it can file. The wives will need to file
as well since they will be cosignatories on the debt, but the wives will
not qualify for filing as individuals since fifty percent of their gross
income the previous year did not come from farming.
If there is no formal partnership agreement, the parties may be
able to argue that the wives are also partners. This analysis will be
governed by the Uniform Partnership Act (in all states except Louisi-
ana).2 7 Section 7 of the Act sets out the rules that determine whether
a partnership relationship exists. 28 The mere joint ownership of prop-
erty, even if profits from use of the property are shared, does not itself
21. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
22. Id. § 101(17)(B).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 101(17)(B)(i).
25. Id. § 101(17)(B)(ii).
26. Id.
27. 6 U.L.A. 1, 2 (Supp. 1988) .
28. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 7 (1914).
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establish a partnership. 29 Nor does the sharing of gross returns estab-
lish a partnership.3" But, the sharing of profits from a business is
prima facie evidence of a partnership as long as the profits were not
wages, debt installments, or similar payments.3' Courts usually say
the key is whether the parties intended to share the profits and losses
and whether they participated in some way in the business.32 If other
evidence suggests no partnership was involved, the mere sharing of
profits is, however, not enough to prove that a partnership existed.
The courts often emphasize management and control. Many
cases point to the fact that the would-be partner worked in the busi-
ness,33 but this is not crucial. For example, Drennan v. Peck (In re
Drennan's Estate)34 held that a father and two sons had been involved
in a farm partnership even though one of the sons lived in Chicago
and did not actively participate in the farm enterprise. 35 The sons
owned the farm equipment, and the court emphasized that the three
men took roughly equal draws on the profit each year.36 If one re-
ceived more than his one third share he took less the next year. This
arrangement continued for ten years until the father died.37 The fact
that one son did not participate in the business did not preclude that
son from being a partner.
One should always determine whether a partnership tax return
has been filed and who is listed as partners on the return. Section
603 1(a) of the Internal Revenue Code requires partnerships to file a
partnership tax return each year.38 It must include the names and
addresses of all individuals who would be entitled to share in any tax-
able income. 39 A partnership return that lists the wives as partners
would be strong evidence that the wives were in fact partners. Courts
often emphasize that a partnership tax return was filed. 4° However,
29. Id. § 7(2).
30. Id. § 7(3).
31. Id. § 7(4).
32. See, e.g., Lyon v. MacQuarrie, 46 Cal. App. 2d 119, 115 P.2d 594 (1941); Cutler v.
Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); Raymonds S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 97 A.2d
245 (1953).
33. See, e.g., Greene v. Brooks, 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1965); Lee v.
Slovak, 81 A.D.2d 98, 440 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1981); Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975);
Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 97 A.2d 245 (1953).
34. Drennan v. Peck (In re Drennan's Estate), 9 Ill. App. 2d 324, 132 N.E.2d 599 (1956).
35. Id. at 327, 132 N.E.2d at 601.
36. Id. at 328-29, 132 N.E.2d at 601-02.
37. Id. at 325, 328-29, 132 N.E.2d at 600, 602.
38. 266 U.S.C. § 6031(a) (1982).
39. Id. § 6323(b).
40. See Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); Puzich v. Pappas, 161 Ind. App.
1988-89]
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failure to file a partnership return is not conclusive that a partnership
does not exist. In In re Drennan's Estate,4 ' the court found that a
farming partnership existed even though the farm enterprise did not
file a partnership return during the ten year period.42 It may be more
difficult to argue that the wives are partners if partnership returns are
filed but never list the wives as partners.
From a policy standpoint, if a wife is obligated on the family
farm debt, she should not be precluded from filing in Chapter 12 sim-
ply because she had nonfarm income and was not a partner in the
farm partnership. If the wife is not in bankruptcy, the creditor can
sue her for the debt and is not stayed from collecting as long as the
debt is a business debt. Chapter 12 stays any action to collect from an
individual not in bankruptcy who is liable on an obligation with a
Chapter 12 debtor.43 However, this protection applies only to con-
sumer debt.' Surely Congress did not intend to create this situation.
If the wife jointly owns farm property, which she usually will, then
the creditor will be able to take farm property while the husband and
brothers are trying to restructure debt in Chapter 12 to keep the farm
enterprise afloat.
II. CONVERSION RIGHTS
There is considerable question whether a farmer who filed a
Chapter 11 petition before the Act creating Chapter 12 became effec-
tive will be able to convert his or her case to a Chapter 12 petition.
The Act amends section 1112(d) to provide for conversion of Chapter
11 cases to Chapter 12 .4  Before allowing conversion the court must
find that the conversion would be equitable.4 6 The problem is created
by the fact that the section allowing conversion is in subtitle B of title
II of the Act.47 The Act provides that the amendments in subtitle B
of title II of the Act "shall not apply with respect to cases commenced
under title II of the United States Code before the effective date of this
191, 314 N.E.2d 795 (1974). In Puzich, the sister had worked in the business until her brothers
kicked her out. For eight years the partnership tax return listed the sister as a 1/4 owner.
41. 9 Ill. App. 2d 324, 132 N.E.2d 599 (1956).
42. Id. at 330, 132 N.E.2d at 602.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1986).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1112(d).
46. Id. § 11 12(d)(3).
47. Section 256 of Pub. L. No. 99-554 amends § 1112(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to allow
conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12. Section 256 is located in subtitle B of title II of the
Act. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 256, 100 Stat. 3114 (1986).
[Vol. 11:49
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Act." '48 The general effective date of the statute was set thirty days
after the date of enactment.49 The language would seem to clearly
indicate that cases filed in Chapter 11 before the effective date of the
Act cannot be converted.
The legislative history conflicts with this interpretation. The
Conference Report for the legislation indicates that Congress in-
tended that pending cases be available for conversion as long as it was
equitable." The report states "[i]t is not intended that there be rou-
tine conversion of Chapter 11 and 13 cases, pending at the time of
enactment, to Chapter 12. Instead it is expected that courts will exer-
cise their sound discretion in each case ... "51 The issue is whether
courts will allow clear legislative history to change clear statutory lan-
guage. The first case to address the issue, In re Tomlin Farms,5 2 held
that where statutory language is clear there is no reason to examine
legislative history. 3 The case involved three debtors who had previ-
ously filed Chapter 11 petitions. One filed a Chapter 11 petition on
October 31, 1986, while the other two filed March 28, 1985, and April
2, 1984, respectively. 4 For the second two debtors, a conversion may
not have been equitable since they had been in Chapter 11 for awhile;
however, for the case filed October 31st, the issue was clearly focused.
The court held that none of these farm cases could be converted to
Chapter 12 because of the clear statutory language.5
Given the conflict between statutory language and legislative his-
tory, conflict among the courts was inevitable. Eight courts in seven
states have allowed conversion if it is equitable. 6 A majority of
courts, however, have agreed with Tomlin Farms that the statutory
language must be given effect. These courts hold that cases filed
48. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farm Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3088, 3119 (1986).
49. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(a), 100 Stat. 3088, 3119 (1986).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986).
51. Id.
52. 68 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986).
53. Id. at 42-43.
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id. at 43.
56.. In re Anderson, 70 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); In re Big Dry Angus Ranch,
Inc., 69 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987);/n re Cobb, 76 Bankr. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1987); In re Erickson Partnership, 68 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. D.S.D.), aff'd, 74 Bankr. 670
(D.S.D. 1987);1n re Fischer, 72 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Henderson, 69 Bankr.
982 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Mason, 70 Bankr. 753 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1987); In re
Mason, 70 Bankr. 757 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1987).
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before November 26, 1986, cannot be converted to Chapter 12.1"
Courts in two states that have not ruled on the conversion ques-
tion have allowed debtors in Chapters 11 and 13 to dismiss their cases
and refile in Chapter 12.58 In re Woloschak Farms5 9 is the more inter-
esting case of the two because it involved dismissal from Chapter 11.
In Chapter 11, unlike Chapter 13, a debtor does not have an unlim-
ited right to dismiss his case. 6 A Montana court has allowed dismis-
sal and refiling but Montana courts also allow conversion.6"
III. FILING A PLAN
In any reorganization effort the farmer must file a plan which
sets out how the indebtedness will be paid. In Chapter 11 the farm
debtor has 120 days after the order for relief in which to file a plan.62
In a voluntary case the order for relief occurs when the case is com-
menced with the filing of the petition.63 The debtor then has 180 days
to file a plan that is accepted.' 4 These 120 and 180 day periods can be
extended by court order for cause.65 Only the debtor has a right to
57. See, e.g., In re Albertson, 68 Bankr. 1017 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Barclay, 69
Bankr. 552 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1987); In re Council, 70 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987); In
re Evans, 72 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); In re Glazier, 69 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1987); In re Hughes, 70 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); In re Keinath Bros. Dairy Farm,
71 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Lindsey, 69 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987);
In re McDonald, 72 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987); In re Petty, 69 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1987); In re Ray, 70 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Rossman, 70 Bankr. 985
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Solomon, 72 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re
B.A.V., Inc., 68 Bankr. 411 (Bankr. Colo. 1986).
58. In re Gamble, 72 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re Woloschak Farms, 70
Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
59. 70 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (Supp. IV 1986) governs dismissal of Chapter 11 cases. Subsection
(b) allows a court to dismiss a case on various grounds, all of which involve a debtor default.
In the Woloschak Farms case the debtor failed to make payments under its Chapter 11 plan.
70 Bankr. at 499-500. This is a ground for involuntary dismissal under subsection (b)(8). The
court granted the motion to dismiss the case and then rejected the creditor's argument that this
amounted to an improper conversion. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (Supp. IV 1986) governs dismissal of
Chapter 13 cases. Subsection (b) gives the debtor an absolute right to dismiss a Chapter 13
case.
61. In re Big Dry Angus Ranch, Inc., 69 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (allowed
conversion); In re Turner, 71 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (allowed dismissal).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
63. Id. § 301.
64. Id. § 1121(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (Supp. III 1985) controls the granting of an extension of time in
which the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan. Bankruptcy courts have discretion. In
re Tony Downs Foods Co., 34 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983). One of the major grounds
for extension of time is a showing by the debtor that he is making progress and that there is
"some promise of probable success in formulating a plan of reorganization .... " In re Pine
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file a plan within these time periods.66 After these time periods have
expired, and no extension has been granted by the court, any party in
interest, including any creditor or creditors' committee, may file a
plan.6 '
The problems created are based on the fact that some courts al-
low confirmation of a creditor's plan that provides for the liquidation
of the farm enterprise, over the farmer's objections.68 Farmers cannot
be involuntarily brought into bankruptcy. 69 Yet, these decisions al-
low liquidation of a farm enterprise even though the creditors could
not drag the farmer into a Chapter 7 proceeding, and even though the
reason the farmer filed in Chapter 11 was to avoid liquidation. 71
A. Tax Ramifications
Apart from the fact that the creditors may be able to force liqui-
dation, liquidating under a creditor's plan in Chapter 11 instead of
liquidating voluntarily in Chapter 7 may have adverse tax conse-
quences on the farmer. The transfer of property voluntarily or invol-
untarily can create tax liability. 7' For example, transfers of farm land
with a low adjusted basis will generate ordinary income on which
taxes will be assessed,'72 and transfers of personal property may gener-
ate recapture of investment tax credits.7  Although the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act eliminated regular investment tax credits on property placed
in service after December 31, 1985, the recapture provisions were left
in the Code.74 This recapture tax is especially onerous because any
Run Trust, Inc., 67 Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). In many cases this means a
showing of a likelihood of successful negotiations with a major creditor. In re Musikahn
Corp., 57 Bankr. 938 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Swatara Coal Co., 49 Bankr. 898 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1985).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
67. Id. § 1121(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
68. Button Hook Cattle Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Button Hook
Cattle Co.), 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984); Jasik v. Conrad (In re Jasik), 727 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.
1984). A lower court has disagreed. See In re Lange, 39 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982). In addition, farmers who have filed in Chapter 11 cannot
have their case converted to a Chapter 7 without their consent. Id. § 1112(c). In Chapter 12,
a family farmer case cannot be converted to Chapter 7 unless the farmer has committed fraud.
Id. § 1208(d).
70. Button Hook Cattle Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984); Jasik, 727 F.2d 1379 (5th
Cir. 1984).
71. Flaccus, Taxes, Farmers, and Bankruptcy and the Impact of the 1986 Tax Changes:
Much Has Been Changed, But Much Remains the Same, 66 NEB. L. REV. 459 (1987).
72. Id. at 459-60.
73. Id. at 467.
74. Id.
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amounts recaptured are added directly to the farmer's tax liability.75
For example, if $10,000 in investment tax credits are recaptured the
farmer owes at least $10,000 in federal income taxes.
In a Chapter 7 liquidation the tax picture is somewhat changed.
When the debtor files a Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy petition, a sepa-
rate taxable entity is created."6 The separate taxable entity is the
bankruptcy estate, but the transfer of the property into the estate is
not a taxable transfer.77 In the Chapter 7 proceeding it is the estate
that transfers the property as long as the trustee has not abandoned
the asset to the debtor. 8 When the estate transfers the property, it is
the estate, not the debtor, that receives the ordinary income. 79 To the
extent that the estate does not pay the resulting taxes, the debtor is
not liable for them. ° The taxes incurred become administrative ex-
penses under section 503(b)(1)(B). 1 They are thus entitled to first
priority status among the unsecured claims.8 2 The important fact
from the farmer's perspective is that, to the extent that taxes remain
unpaid, he or she is not responsible for them.
This analysis may not apply to tax liability arising from the re-
capture of investment tax credits.8 3 The two cases that address the
issue hold that the taxes resulting from a recapture of investment tax
credits are a prepetition tax debt under section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) not
an administrative expense.8" The effect of these holdings is to make
the taxes nondischargeable. All of section 507(a)(7) taxes are nondis-
chargeable.8 5 The cases state that recapture of investment tax credits
are merely a reinstatement of the tax liability owed before the petition
but not paid because the investment tax credit was taken. 6 However,
the reasoning in both cases is flawed. The first case, In re Higgins,8 7
75. Id. at 470-71.
76. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(f) (1982).
77. Id.
78. Flaccus, supra note 71, at 467-70, 482-84.
79. Id. at 467.
80. Id. at 467-70.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (1982).
82. Id. § 507(a)(1).
83. Flaccus, supra note 71, at 470-75.
84. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196 (Bankr. D. Iowa 1983); In re Davidson Lumber Co., 47
Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
85. Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code sets out priority rules. Section 507(a)(7) are a
number of generally prepetition taxes that are given a seventh priority. Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code sets out nondischargeable debts. Section 523(a)(1)(A) makes § 507(a)(7)
taxes nondischargeable.
86. Higgins, 29 Bankr. at 201; Davidson Lumber Co., 47 Bankr. at 599.
87. 29 Bankr. 196. (Bankr. D. Iowa 1983).
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was controlled by the law that existed before the effective date of the
1980 Bankruptcy Tax Act.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Tax Act the IRS took the position that
the transfer of assets into the estate triggered the recapture of invest-
ment tax credit.88 Under this interpretation it is easy to argue that the
recapture occurred prepetition and was not incurred by the estate.
The Bankruptcy Tax Act now controls this question and it provides
that the transfer to the estate is not a taxable transfer. 89 The second
case which holds that investment tax credit recapture taxes are prepe-
tition taxes is In re Davidson Lumber Co.90 Since this case was con-
trolled by the 1980 Bankruptcy Tax Act it cannot be distinguished on
the same basis, yet, the Davidson court for the most part merely fol-
lows Higgins. There is room for courts to disagree with these two
cases.
A court could disagree with these cases on one of two bases.9'
First a court could hold that recapture of investment credit taxes are
incurred by the estate, since it is estate action which triggers the re-
capture.92 If this were the holding, the taxes would be administrative
expenses and a liability of the estate not the debtor. Second, even if a
court would hold that these taxes are not incurred by the estate be-
cause they are prepetition taxes, it could hold that these taxes are not
section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) taxes.93 Section 507(a)(7)(A) taxes are taxes
"on or measured by income or gross receipts." 94 The tax based on a
recapture of an investment tax credit is based on the amount of taxes
88. Rev. Rul. 74-26, 1974; Mueller v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 36, 47 (1973).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1982).
90. 47 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
91. Flaccus, supra note 71, at 472-75.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 474-75.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (Supp. III 1985) states:
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for-
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts-
(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of filing of the petition
for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions, after three years
before the date of the filing of the petition;
(ii) assessed within 240 days, plus any time plus 30 days during which an
offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was made within 240 days
after such assessment was pending, before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or
523(a)(1)(C) of this title, not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable
law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the case;
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previously not paid because the credit was taken.95 It is not "on or
measured by income or gross receipts." 96 If these taxes were prepeti-
tion taxes but not section 507(a)(7)(A) taxes, they would be dis-
charged along with other Chapter 7 unsecured debt.9 7 Thus, despite
the Higgins and Davidson cases, a good argument can be made that a
farmer should not owe recapture of investment tax credit taxes after
bankruptcy.
As can be seen, liquidation inside a Chapter 7 proceeding can
minimize the liquidation taxes the farmer will owe after bankruptcy.
This may not be the case if the farm is liquidated under a Chapter 11
creditor plan, or if some property is liquidated under a Chapter 11
plan and the debtor later files a Chapter 7 petition.
The cases in the area deal with the following fact pattern: (1) a
business files a Chapter 11 petition; (2) the plan proposed by the
debtor in possession is confirmed; (3) taxes are incurred by the opera-
tion of the business after confirmation of the plan; and (4) the business
fails despite the reorganization, so it files for Chapter 7 liquidation.
Courts hold that the taxes accrued post confirmation are not incurred
by the estate and therefore not administrative expenses from the
Chapter 11 proceeding.98 Section 348(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
treats all claims, except administrative claims that arise after the or-
der for relief but before conversion of the case, as if such claims had
arisen immediately before the filing of the petition.9 9 The effect is that
taxes which are incurred after confirmation of the plan are treated like
prepetition claims once the case is converted to Chapter 7.'00 This
turns many of these taxes into section 507(a)(7) taxes which are given
a seventh priority but are nondischargeable to the extent they are not
95. Higgins, 29 Bankr. at 201; Davidson Lumber Co., 47 Bankr. at 599.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
97. Only § 507(a)(7)(A) taxes are made nondischargeable. Id. § 523(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1986). Other prepetition taxes would be discharged along with other prepetition unsecured
debt. Id. § 727(b) (1982).
98. In re Westholt Mfg., 20 Bankr. 368 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), aff'd, 36 Bankr. 932
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984).
99. Section 348(d) states:
(d) A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief
but before conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of
this title, other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for
all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of
the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (Supp. IV 1986). Note that this statute deals also with conversion under
§ 1208. Thus, if transfers of property were made by the farmer under a Chapter 12 plan, when
the case was converted to a Chapter 7, any resulting taxes would be prepetition debt.
100. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5834.
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paid.10
The only exception to this prepetition treatment under section
348(d) is for administrative claims. 10 2 Yet, postconfirmation claims,
including tax claims, are not administrative claims because confirma-
tion of the plan terminates the bankruptcy estate. 103 Section 1141(b)
vests all the property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation
unless otherwise provided in the plan."o Administrative claims must
be incurred by the estate.'0 5 The plan binds all parties and discharges
the debtor from all debts arising prior to confirmation.10 6
The transfer of assets from the estate to the debtor after confir-
mation of the plan is itself not a taxable transfer. 0 7 However, if sales
or exchanges of property are made under the plan, the resulting tax
liability will not be an administrative expense. 0 8 If the case is con-
verted to a Chapter 7 after the sale or exchange of property under the
plan, the resulting taxes will be a prepetition liability in the Chapter
7.109
If the creditors get a Chapter 11 liquidation plan confirmed, so
that liquidation is in Chapter 11, not Chapter 7, there is no conver-
sion and section 348(d) does not apply. However, since the liquida-
tion is taking place under a confirmed plan, any resulting transfer
taxes would not be an administrative expense. I10 If the plan calls for
the farmer to make the transfers, then the resulting transfer tax liabil-
ity will be a liability of the farmer. The assets generated when the
property is transferred will be used to pay off other creditors, not to
pay off the tax liability. It is irrelevant that the transfer was an invol-
untary one because tax liability can be generated whether the transfer
is voluntary or involuntary. " ' I
Thus, in terms of filing a plan, Chapter 11 has a number of disad-
vantages. First a farmer may be involuntarily liquidated under a
creditor's plan. Second, any transfer taxes generated by any sales or
101. See supra note 85.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1982).
103. Id. § 1141 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
104. Id. § 1141(b) (1982).
105. Id. § 503(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
106. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1982).
107. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(f)(2) (1982).
108. This is because the tax is not incurred by the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
109. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(a) (1982).
111. 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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exchanges of property under a confirmed plan will not be a tax of the
estate but rather a tax of the farmer-debtor.
The filing of a plan in Chapter 12 avoids some of these difficul-
ties. From a tax standpoint, the filing of a plan in Chapter 12 does not
create a separate taxable entity. 1 2 Therefore, even if property is
transferred before confirmation of the plan, any resulting taxes would
be taxes of the debtor not the estate. In this respect, Chapter 11 is
preferable. But this difficulty is greatly alleviated by the fact that con-
firmation of a plan should occur much earlier in a Chapter 12 pro-
ceeding than is normally the case in Chapter 11, and only the debtor
can file a Chapter 12 plan. If things are not going well for the farmer
in Chapter 12, he or she has an absolute right to dismiss the case.'13
B. Requirements Between the Filing of the Petition and
Confirmation of a Plan
A Chapter 12 debtor has 90 days after filing the petition to file a
plan."1 4 The confirmation hearing must, except for cause, conclude
no more than 45 days after the plan is filed." 5 These shorter time
limitations should accelerate confirmation. It should be noted that
while Chapter 11 has short time limits for filing plan," 6 Chapter 11
cases can still drag on for years." 7 But there is a more fundamental
difference which should greatly accelerate plan confirmation in Chap-
ter 12 cases. In Chapter 11 the major cause of delay is the negotiation
process which is at the heart of a Chapter 11 proceeding. The credi-
tors in a Chapter 11 case have a right to approve or disapprove a plan
if their claims are impaired." 8 If an impaired class of creditors disap-
proves the plan, the plan cannot be confirmed unless it meets the
"cram down" requirements of the Code.' 9 This has been a major
112, 26 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1982) covers only cases arising under Chapters 7 and 11.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (Supp. IV 1986) gives the debtor an absolute right to dismiss the
case.
114. Id. § 1221.
115. Id. § 1224.
116. Id. § 1121(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
117. See supra note 65.
118. Section 1124 states a class of claims is impaired unless the plan does one of three
things. First, it can leave unaltered the contractual rights to which such claim entitles the
holder of such claim. Second, it can cure defaults and reinstate the contractual terms. Third,
it can pay on the effective date of the plan cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim. 11
U.S.C. § 1124(1), (2), (3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1126 empowers the holders of
claims and interests to vote on the plan. Id. § 1126 (1982). Confirmation requires that each
class either accept the plan or not be impaired under the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(8) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
119. If a plan cannot be confirmed solely because § 1129(a)(8) cannot be met, then
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stumbling block in farm reorganizations.
A class of creditors is impaired when the creditors are not being
paid the full amount of their allowed claims.120 Because of the "cram
down" requirements, farmers who wish to retain farm property and
pay unsecured creditors less than the full amount of their claim can-
not do so without the class approving the plan.' 2 ' The need for class
approval generates negotiation. If negotiations fail and an impaired
class refuses to approve the plan, the only way of getting a confirmed
plan is to "cram it down."
A "cram down" must pass the "fair and equitable"' 22 test which
incorporates, for the most part, the absolute priority rule under the
Bankruptcy Act.'2 3 This means that no claimant junior in priority
can retain or gain anything under the plan unless senior claimants are
paid in full.' 24 In the case of the farmer, if the farm is incorporated,
the shareholders can not retain anything under the plan unless se-
cured and unsecured creditors are receiving payment in full on their
allowed claims. If the farm is not incorporated, then the owners, pre-
sumably the farmer and his wife, can not retain any of the farm assets
unless the creditors are paid the allowed amount of their claims.
Since most ownership interests want to continue owning the as-
sets of the business, the emphasis in Chapter 11 is on negotiated com-
promises. Most confirmed plans are approved by the creditors, not
crammed down.' 25 Negotiation can take time, and it is not unusual
for Chapter 11 cases to drag on for over a year before any confirma-
tion decision. 2 6 The delay is costly to both the debtor and creditors.
Just before the passage of Chapter 12 legislation, the United
§ 1129(b) provides for a "cram down." If the "cram down" requirements can be met, then the
plan can be confirmed even though § 1129(a)(8) has not been met. Id. § 1129(b) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
120. Id. § 1124 (1982). See supra note 118 (There are three ways of keeping a class from
being impaired).
121. This is the case now that the United States Supreme Court, in Norwest Bank Worth-
ington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988), reversed the Eighth Circuit decision. In re Ahlers, 794
F.2d 388, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) defines what constitutes a fair and
equitable plan.
124. For example, unsecured creditors must either be paid the allowed amount of their
claim or the holder of any interest that is junior to the unsecured creditors can receive or retain
no interest in any property. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1982). Ownership interests are junior to
creditors.
125. Kenneth Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 543 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
126. United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc. (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assoc.), 808 F.2d 363, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) (en banc).
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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in In re Ahlers,127
placed a new wrinkle on the Chapter 11 "cram down" that would
have helped farmers. The court held that a plan could be crammed
down over dissenting classes and that the farmer could retain assets
under the plan. 128 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that business owners may retain
interests in property if they contribute new funds to help in the reha-
bilitation process.129 The typical case involves shareholders. Nor-
mally in a "cram down" the shareholders cannot retain their
ownership interest in the business unless unsecured creditors are paid
in full. However, if the shareholders contribute new funds, they are
entitled to share in the ownership of corporate assets to the extent of
the contributed funds. The new wrinkle added by the Eighth Circuit
was to extend the concept of new value to include the value of the
farmer's labor, including his or her experience and expertise in farm-
ing the land. 13 0
The court noted that the Supreme Court has ruled that "money
or money's worth" was sufficient.' 3 ' Applying this rule, two things
would have to be valued. First, the worth of the farmer's labor had to
be calculated, including compensation for experience and expertise. 32
The court provided the following example. If the value each year of
the farmer's input is $40,000 and the farmer receives yearly living
expenses of $12,000, the farmer has added $28,000 per year in value
for his or her retained ownership interest. 33 Second, the value of the
business at the end of the plan must be estimated to determine the
worth of the farmer's retained interest. ' 34 The court noted that this
was a more difficult valuation but was not impossible. 3  Once these
values have been established they can be compared.136 As long as the
farmer's retained interest was not worth more than the value of the
farmer's input in the farming operation over the life of the plan, the
plan could be confirmed even though unsecured creditors did not con-
127. 794 F.2d 388, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
128. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399-403.
129. Id. at 401-02.
130. Id. at 399-403.
131. Id. at 401 (quoting Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121
(1939)).
132. Id. at 402.
133. Id. at 403 n.17.
134. Id. at 402-03.
135. Id. at 402.
136. Id.
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sent and would not receive payment in full. 137
Had Ahlers remained the law, this would have removed a major
stumbling block for farmers reorganizing in Chapter 11. In March
1988, however, the Supreme Court 138 reversed the Eighth Circuit's
ruling. The Supreme Court held that a farmer's work and experience
were not "money or money's worth" for purposes of the "fair and
equitable" test.' 39 The ruling reinstates the need for a negotiated set-
tlement if the farmer wants to keep the farm assets. It will be very
difficult for most farmers to obtain a confirmed plan in Chapter 11
unless their creditors are willing to bend.
In a Chapter 12 case there is no "cram down" and no "absolute
priority rule" because the creditors, both secured and unsecured, have
no right to approve or disapprove a plan. Once the plan meets the
requirements of section 1225 for court confirmation, the plan will
bind creditors whether they object or not.'"
The filing and confirmation of a plan should be considerably eas-
ier in Chapter 12 than in Chapter 11. If the farmer cannot construct a
confirmable plan the worst thing that can happen is that this case will
be dismissed.' 4 ' The farm enterprise will not be subject to liquidation
under a creditor's plan. The main drawback of dismissal is that the
farmer may be precluded from refiling bankruptcy under another
chapter for 180 days after the dismissal. 142 Section 109, which defines
who can and cannot be a debtor under the various bankruptcy chap-
ters, was amended in 1984 to preclude a debtor, whose case was dis-
missed, from refiling in bankruptcy for the next 180 days. 143 This 180
day bar applies only to specified dismissals, such as dismissals by the
court for failure to abide by court orders or failure to appear in proper
prosecution of the case,'" and dismissals by the debtor following a
creditor's request for relief from the stay. 4 ' It is this latter type of
dismissal that is most likely to occur in a farm bankruptcy when the
farmer is finding it difficult to draw up a plan.
To avoid the 180 day bar and the inconvenience of renewed cred-
itor action once the stay is lifted, a farmer who cannot get a Chapter
137. Id. at 403.
138. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
139. Id.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
141. Id. § 1208(c)(3).
142. Id. § 109(g).
143. Id. § 109(f).
144. Id. § 109(g)(1).
145. Id. § 109(g)(2).
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12 plan confirmed should seriously consider liquidation before dismis-
sal. If liquidation of the farm enterprise is going to happen once the
bankruptcy stay is removed, conversion to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
liquidation should be evaluated. 146 If liquidation is inevitable, it may
be better to liquidate in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy discharge
should be considered, and the farmer's postbankruptcy liquidation tax
picture should be evaluated. The tax burden of liquidation in bank-
ruptcy might be considerably lighter than in liquidation outside of
bankruptcy. 14
7
IV. LOST OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Until very recently a big debate was occurring among the courts
over whether an undersecured creditor in Chapter 11 could be com-
pensated for lost opportunity costs. An oversecured creditor is enti-
tled to include interest accruing postpetition to his or her claim up to
the value of the collateral.' 48 As long as the value of the collateral
supports it, the fully secured creditor can also be compensated for
costs and charges provided by the parties' agreement. 49 In contrast,
the undersecured creditor is not entitled to postpetition interest. ° In
fact, postpetition interest is specifically excluded from an under-
secured creditor's allowable claim.' 51
In the 1984 case, Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner
Industries, 52 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that undersecured creditors were entitled to be compensated
for the money they would have received had they been able to repos-
sess the collateral, sell the property, and reinvest the proceeds. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the creditor was precluded from realizing
these sums because of the bankruptcy stay and should be compen-
sated for this loss.'53 The court found statutory support for its analy-
sis. in section 361 of the Code. 54  Section 361 defines adequate
protection."' If a creditor's interest is not being adequately pro-
146. Id. § 1208(a).
147. See Flaccus, supra note 71.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. 111 1985).
149. Id.
150. Section 506(b) only applies to the extent that an allowed secured claim "is secured by
property the value of which ... is greater than the amount of such claim .... " Id. § 506(b)
(1982).
151. Id. § 502(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
152. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
153. Id. at 431.
154. Id.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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tected, this is grounds for relief from the stay whether or not the prop-
erty is necessary for an effective reorganization.156
After American Mariner came down, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits followed the holding with
minor variations. 5 ' However, in 1986 the Fifth Circuit, in a well rea-
soned opinion, held that lost opportunity costs could not be awarded
to an undersecured creditor.'58 Finding that lost opportunity costs
were really compensation -for postpetition interest, the United States
Supreme Court, in January 1988, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's denial of
opportunity costs. 15 9 Now that tht debate has been settled, creditors
may actually fare better in Chapter 12.
Farmers in Chapter 12 proceedings have never had to worry
about how the debate over opportunity costs was resolved. The draft-
ers of Chapter 12 wished to eliminate the opportunity cost problems
for farmers, so they made section 361 inapplicable to Chapter 12 cases
and defined adequate protection in section 1205(b) for Chapter 12
cases."' ° The Joint Conference Report explains that payment of lost
opportunity costs often "throttles" farm cases at the beginning be-
cause the farmer can not make the periodic payments.' 6' The Report
explains that this is why the "indubitable equivalent" language was
taken out and that the change "makes it clear that what needs to be
protected is the value of the property, not the value of the creditor's
'interest in property.' ",162
Section 1205 provides four specified ways of providing adequate
protection. 6 The first two are similar to subsections 1 and 2 in sec-
tion 361. They provide for periodic payments and/or replacement
liens to compensate the secured creditor for a decrease in value of the
collateral."' 4 The fourth provision provides, in general, for ade-
quately protecting the value of the collateral other than by providing
156. Section 362(d) sets out the grounds for relief from the stay. One of these grounds is
for "cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest ... " Id. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
157. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1434 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
158. United States Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assoc.), 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
159. Timbers ofInwood Forest Assoc., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. III
1985) permits post petition interest to accrue only for oversecured creditors.
160. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1986).
161. Id. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 50.
162. Id.
163. II U.S.C. § 1205 (Supp. IV 1986).
164. Id. § 1205(), (2).
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administrative expense priority.'65 All three of these provisions base
compensation on the decrease in value of the collateral. Subsection
three does not. It provides "such adequate protection may be pro-
vided by ... paying to such entity for the use of farmland the reason-
able rent customary in the community where the property is located,
based upon the rental value, net income, and earning capacity of the
property .... 166
Section 1205 arguably provides a form of opportunity costs. If a
secured creditor could foreclose on the land, one of the ways it could
reinvest would be to rent out the land. This section, unlike the other
sections, is not tied to the decrease in the value of the collateral.
Therefore, even if the value of the farmland were not declining, sub-
section three seems to authorize payment to the mortgagee of the rea-
sonable rental value of the land. If subsection three is construed by
the courts to allow such payments when the value of the farmland is
not declining, an anomaly is created. In section 1205, it is the only
form of adequate protection not tied to decrease in value, yet it is
limited to mortgagees. This suggests that the farm equipment lender
is entitled to compensation only when the value of the equipment is
declining, and this would be giving mortgagees special treatment.
Nothing in the conference report suggests this was intended, yet it is
arguably what the statutory language suggests.
If the Chapter 12 time periods, 90 days for filing a plan and 45
days after that for the final confirmation hearing, are strictly followed,
the period between petition filing and confirmation of the plan should
be relatively short.' 67 This should lessen the importance of any op-
portunity costs even if section 1205 is construed to provide them. In
fact, in the view of some judges, one of the functions of awarding
creditors lost opportunity costs in Chapter 11 is to hasten the negotia-
tion process. As the dissenters in the en banc opinion in In re Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Inc.'68 note, payment for lost opportunity
costs does not begin immediately, and, to the extent that it puts pres-
sure on the debtor and unsecured creditors, payment may hasten con-
firmation of a plan if such is possible.
It is interesting that the award to mortgagees of fair rent could
place the mortgagees in a better position than they would have been in
165. Section 1205(b)(4) states that "adequate protection may be provided by ... granting
such other relief... as will adequately protect the value of property securing a claim or of such
entity's ownership interest in the property." Id. § 1205(b)(4).
166. Id. § 1205(b)(3).
167. Id. §§ 1221, 1224.
168. 808 F.2d 363, 375-84 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) (en banc).
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Chapter 11. It is doubtful that Congress intended this result. Since
the time periods between the filing of the petition and plan confirma-
tion should be short, however, payment of reasonable rent should not
place the Chapter 12 farmer at a disadvantage.
V. POSTPETITION FINANCING AND USE OF COLLATERAL
Since the whole purpose of filing in Chapter 12 is to keep the
farm enterprise functioning, each case will have "use, sale, or lease"
questions and a concern about the procurement of postpetition credit.
All ongoing businesses in bankruptcy fall under the "use, sale, or
lease" restrictions of section 363.69 No section in Chapter 12
preempts the application of section 363, therefore, the use, sale or
lease of property in Chapter 12 should be much like its counterpart in
Chapter 11. The one exception is that section 1206 allows the precon-
firmation sale of certain property free and clear of the interests of
creditors as long as the secured party gets a lien on the proceeds.' 70
However, obtaining postpetition credit in Chapter 12 may be no easier
than in Chapter 11.
To illustrate these two problems, consider the following facts
which are not atypical in farm bankruptcies. Farmer Brown filed in
Chapter 12 on March 1, 1986, because no lender was willing to lend
Farmer Brown money to finance his 1986 crop. Now that bankruptcy
has been filed, Farmer Brown needs to find capital to finance the crop.
Capital can be found two ways: (1) postpetition credit and (2) the sale
of farm property. Section 364 provides certain "carrots" to entice
lenders to extend postpetition credit. 7 ' First, it should be noted that
section 364 refers to action by a trustee. However, it specifically re-
fers to section 1203.1"2 Section 1203 gives the debtor in possession,
the farmer, all the powers of a trustee operating the business, with a
few exceptions, such as the right to compensation.' 73 Thus, the
farmer is able to take advantage of section 364's "carrots."
The first "carrot" is that postpetition unsecured credit incurred
in the ordinary course of business is treated as an administrative ex-
pense. 17 4 As an administrative expense, these unsecured creditors
have first priority after secured creditors. 17' It should be noted, how-
169. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
170. Id. § 1206 (Supp. IV 1986).
171. Id. § 364 (1982).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 1203 (Supp. IV 1986).
174. Id. § 364(1) (1982).
175. Administrative expenses are given a first priority by § 507. Id. § 507(a)(1). Section
1988-89]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
ever, that some courts have held that the credit must also have been
beneficial to the estate,1 76 as is the requirement for administrative ex-
penses in section 503(b).1 77
Even if the postpetition creditor's claim is treated as an adminis-
trative expense, the creditor's interest could remain unpaid. Adminis-
trative expense treatment gives the creditor priority over prepetition
unsecured debt in a Chapter 7 petition.1 78 As will be seen, however,
some of the "carrots" in section 364 give other postpetition creditors
priority over administrative claims. These "carrots" are available
only upon court approval. One of the "carrots" is a grant to a post-
petition creditor of a "priority over any or all administrative expenses
of the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title ....
In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weinbtraub8 ° the court
held that attorneys and accountants of the debtor were entitled to
have their fees treated as administrative claims. General Electric
Credit Corporation (GECC) financed the debtor's day-to-day opera-
tions under an order giving it section 364(c)(1) priority.1 8 ' The Sec-
ond Circuit held that GECC had priority over the attorneys and
accountants. Since no assets remained once GECC was paid, there
were no assets left to pay anyone else.'8 2 Thus, postpetition creditors
entitled to an administrative expense priority under section 1364(a)
are at risk of not getting paid because section 364(c)(1) gives priority
over the administrative claims in sections 503(b) and 507(b). 83 At-
torney and accountants claims are made administrative expenses by
section 330. Section 503(b)(2) specifically refers to section 330
claims.'84 Section 503(b) does not specifically refer to section 364(a)
but it does refer to actual costs of preserving the estate.'8 Thus, the
section 364(a) claimant may lose priority to a section 364(c)(1) claim-
ant as happened in the General Electric case.
1222(a)(2) requires all Chapter 12 plans to pay § 507 claims in full under the plan. Id.
§ 1222(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
176. See, e.g., In re Dakota Indus., Inc., 31 Bankr. 23, 26 (Bankr. S.D. 1983).
177. Section 503(b)(l)(A) includes "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate .... 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
178. Section 726 sets up the distribution scheme in Chapter 7. Section 726(a)(1) distributes
property first to priority claimants under § 507. Only after all priority claims have been paid
will other unsecured claims be paid. Id. § 726(a)(1), (2) (1982).
179. Id. § 364(c)(1).
180. 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
181. Id. at 74.
182. Id. at 73-76.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) (1982).
184. Id. § 503(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
185. Id. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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Administrative claimants may also lose to a section 364(c)(2) or
(3) claimant. These subsections give the postpetition creditor either a
lien on unencumbered assets or a junior lien on encumbered assets. 8 6
Any time equity is encumbered, it potentially removes assets that
would otherwise be available to pay unsecured creditors, including
prioritized unsecured creditors. The danger to the postpetition ad-
ministrative claimant also stems from the fact that in Chapter 12, un-
like Chapter 11, administrative claims do not need to be paid in full
before confirmation of the plan.187 Section 1222(a)(2) states that the
plan must pay section 507 claims in full, but can be done in deferred
cash payments.' Administrative claims are section 507(a)(1)
claims. 89
If the farmer cannot complete plan payments the administrative
claims may not get paid. This danger of not getting paid despite hav-
ing an administrative claim means that the granting of administrative
expense status may not be enough to attract postpetition credit. If
there is no equity in any of the farm assets, section 364(c)(2) or (3)
cannot be used, which may make it difficult for the farmer to attract
credit. Section 364(d)(1) authorizes the court to grant a lien to a
postpetition credit extender that is superior or equal to existing
liens. ' 90 This is the most attractive "carrot" to the postpetition credi-
tor. It is granted only sparingly, however, and can be granted only if
there is adequate protection for the liens already on the property.'
Therefore, farmers should not count on the availability of section
364(d)(1) to attract postpetition credit.
Another area of possible crop funding is the proceeds from the
sale of stored farm products. The use of these assets for future pro-
duction, however, will not be any easier in Chapter 12 than it is in
Chapter 11. The difficulty is created when a secured party has a se-
curity interest in the stored farm products because the secured party
often objects to sale. Although section 363(c)(1) allows a debtor in
possession to use and sell assets in the ordinary course of business
without court approval, 92 such sale will not be free of the secured
186. Id. § 364(c)(1), (2) (1982).
187. Section I1 29(a)(9)(A) requires administrative claims, § 507(a)(l) claims, to be paid in
cash on the effective date of the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In con-
trast, § 1222(a)(2) requires all § 507 claims, which include administrative claims, to be paid in
full over the life of the plan. Id. § 1222(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
188. Id. § 1222(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
189. Id. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
190. Id. § 364(d)(1).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 363(c)(1).
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party's lien unless one of the grounds in section 363(f) is met. 193 Sec-
tion 363(f) allows sales free and clear of liens under certain circum-
stances such as creditor consent. 194 If the secured party does not
consent to the sale at the time of the hearing, authorization for the
sale might be found in places other than the security agreement. Us-
age of trade and course of dealing might be used to find authorization
for the sale conducted. 195
If the secured party has not consented to the sale there are other
grounds in section 363(f) on which a court can allow sales free and
clear of liens. 196 The language in section 363(f)(5) is the most appli-
cable,' 97 but the statutory language in section 363(f)(5) suggests that
if the property to be sold is worth less than the debt it cannot be
sold. 198 Yet, Collier argues that section 363(f)(5) should be read to
allow a sale as long as the secured party is given a lien on the proceeds
of the sale.199 Cases dealing with farm products have allowed their
sale free and clear of liens as long as the secured party is given a lien
on the proceeds.2 °°
Chapter 12 settles this issue for farmland and farm equipment
sales. 2° ' For the sale of farmland and farm equipment, section 1206
allows a farmer to sell such property free and clear of liens under
section 363(b) and (c) as long as the lien holder is given a lien in the
proceeds.202 This section does not, however, apply to the sale of farm
products.20 3 To sell farm products free and clear of an unconsenting
creditor's lien, the debtor will have to rely on Collier and similar cases
that allow a sale under section 363(f)(5).
Even if the farmer can sell the farm products free and clear of the
193. Section 363(f) states: "The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate,
only if...." Id. § 363(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
194. Id. § 363(f)(2) (1982).
195. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) has been effectively changed by § 1324 of the 1985 Farm Bill. Now
the question of whether a sale cuts off a security interest is more complicated. If the sale is
authorized, however, the sale cuts off the security interest. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978). Agree-
ments can be formed not only by explicit language but also by the party's course of dealing,
usage of trade and course of performance. Id. § 1-201(3).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1), (3), (4), (5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
197. Id. § 363(f)(5) (1982).
198. Section 363(f)(5) states: "[Sluch entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept money satisfaction of such interest." Id. § 363(f)(5).
199. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 363-31, 32 (1985).
200. See, e.g., In re Frank, 27 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Nikolaisen,
38 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984), rev'd, In re Berg, 42 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 1206 (Supp. IV 1986).
202. Id.
203. Id. It applies only to the sale of farmland and farm equipment.
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secured party's lien, the lien attaches to the proceeds. Under state
law, section 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code allows the se-
curity interest to attach to identifiable proceeds in spite of the absence
of any such clause in the security agreement.2° Section 552(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code allows a prepetition security interest to reach "pro-
ceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits" of the collateral acquired
postpetition.2 °5 Moreover, section 363(e) requires adequate protec-
tion of a secured party's interest if the secured party objects to the
sale.2o
Once the farm products are sold and the creditor is given a lien
on the proceeds, the collateral is cash collateral, and may not be used,
even in the ordinary course of business, unless the court approves
such use.20 7 Here farmers can run into difficulty. The issue at the
hearing is whether the secured party's lien will be adequately pro-
tected if the secured party is given a lien on the future crops. Unlike
the situation where cars are sold and the cash is used to buy new cars,
the existence, amount, price, and quality of future crops are contin-
gent on a number of factors, many of which are outside the farmer's
control. For example, a secured party with a security interest in
10,000 bushels of corn which was turned into cash, may find itself
after the next harvest with a security interest in 5,000 bushels of corn.
Despite these problems, however, a number of courts have allowed
the farmer to use the cash for planting as long as the secured party is
given a lien on the future crops and the farmer takes out crop
insurance.
In In re Sheehan208 debtors had a 16,703 acre farm which was
used for growing irrigated corn and raising cattle. The court noted
that the cash was to be used exclusively for the corn, and not the
cattle operation.2" The farmer, provided a detailed budget including
crop projects, a replacement lien on future crops, payment of interest
on the use of the money, all-risk crop insurance on 100% of the crop,
services of an accountant, reasonable inspection rights for the secured
party, a new professional experienced management team, ten exper-
ienced farmhands, and a promise to deposit cash until used in a sol-
vent bank.210 At the hearing, the accountant testified to the reliability
204. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III 1985).
206. Id. § 363(e) (1982).
207. Id. § 363(c)(2).
208. 38 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984).
209. Id. at 865 n. 1.
210. Id. at 865.
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of the budget figures,2 1' and testimony was provided concerning the
historical bases for the figures.212 The court also noted that the
debtor's crop income had always exceeded the costs of production213
and discussed the background of key workers. 214 Based on these fac-
tors the court held that the secured parties were adequately protected.
In contrast is the case of In re Frank,21 5 where the court refused
to allow the debtors to use the proceeds from their stored soybeans to
buy cattle. The cattle were to be raised in Tennessee even though the
farm and grain were located in Ohio. The debtors did not testify at
the hearing.216 The court found that the proposed plan was too spec-
ulative.217 It emphasized that the debtors had not even provided a
detailed plan as to how all the costs associated with raising the cattle
were to be paid.218 Most importantly, the court noted that the farm-
ers were proposing to enter a different line of farming without justify-
ing that such a move was a sensible and sound business decision.219
Thus, the court held that the creditor was not adequately
protected.22 °
In In re Berens 22 1 a Minnesota bankruptcy court allowed the use
of cash collateral to plant crops on land the farmers owned but pro-
hibited the use of the cash to grow crops on rented land. It should
also be noted that the court allowed use of the cash on the owned land
despite the fact that only hail and not "all-risk" insurance was pro-
vided.2 2 2 A significant projected profit may have influenced the
court.2 2 3 The court's refusal to allow use of cash collateral on the
rented land was supported by a number of factors. First, rent of
$45,000 was due on the land.224 With the rent expense factored in,
the profit margin was very low. 2 25 Moreover, if the rent was not paid,
the crop lender's lien would have a priority conflict with the landlord
211. Id. at 865-66.
212. Id. at 866.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 27 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
216. Id. at 749.
217. Id. at 750.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 41 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
222. Id. at 526-27.
223. Id. at 527.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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lien.226 Second, the farmers were unable to get all-risk crop insur-
ance. 227 Third, based on the total expenses needed, the budget pro-
jected a $59,000 shortfall.2 2 8 The court noted that the farmer's way of
dealing with the shortfall would result in lower crop yields which in
turn would reduce profit.229
In In re Martin 23o the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed a bankruptcy court's allowance of the use of
cash collateral because the trial court's analysis was too superficial. 23'
The bankruptcy court had found that a replacement lien and crop
insurance guaranteed protection to the creditor.232 Providing little, if
any, analysis, the court merely noted that the secured party was ade-
quately protected.233 The Eighth Circuit's analysis suggests that
among the bankruptcy decisions discussed above,23 4 only the Sheehan
court made a sufficiently detailed examination of the issues.2 3 5 First,
the Eighth Circuit held that it was error not to specifically value the
secured party's current rights.236 Next the court delineated the fac-
tors that needed to be considered to ensure that the current value of
the secured party's interest was protected.237 The court noted that
even all-risk crop insurance does not eliminate all risks2 38 and found
that crop insurance does not protect the secured party from avoidable
consequences, 239 because the policy disclaims loss due to neglect or
failure to follow good husbandry practices. 2 ° Thus, the court listed
various factors to consider in determining whether the secured party
was completely protected.
First, the bankruptcy court was instructed to consider the antici-
pated yield given the productivity of the land and the husbandry prac-
tices of the farmers.241 Included within this analysis would be an
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 527-28.
229. Id. at 527.
230. 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985).
231. Id. at 473.
232. In re Nikolaisen, 38 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. D.N.D.), rev'd, In re Berg, 42 Bankr. 335
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 208-29.
235. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 1985).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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examination of crop yields from previous years, the health and relia-
bility of the farmer, the condition of machinery and whether it might
be repossessed before harvest.2 4 2 Second, the court was instructed to
determine whether the secured party's lien on the growing crop could
be competing with other encumbrances on the crop.2 43 Last, an anal-
ysis of anticipated market prices at harvest and the possible variations
therein had to be considered. 24" The court noted that the list was not
exhaustive,245 but it provides a good indication of the type of evidence
a farmer should provide. The farmer has the burden of proof on the
issue of adequate protection.246
In Chapter 12, since a creditor's approval of the plan is not
needed and an expedited court hearing is provided, farmers may be
able to get a plan confirmed before needing credit. Once the plan is
confirmed, Chapter 12 does provide some added flexibility over what
is available in Chapter 11. Section 1111 (b) in Chapter 11 allows an
undersecured creditor to elect to have his or her full debt considered a
secured claim.247 This election eliminates any unsecured claim, but it
does not require the Chapter 11 debtor to pay the full amount of the
claim under the plan.248 This is because section 1129(a)(7)(B) re-
quires the plan to pay the creditor an amount equal to the present
value of that creditor's interest in the collateral, not the present value
of the creditor's claim.2 49 A section 1111(b) election does, however,
restrict the debtor's freedom by precluding the cashing out of a claim
at the beginning of the plan.250 For example, a farm debtor might
want to sell some farm equipment not needed on the restructured
farm, but if the secured party with a security interest in the equipment
were undersecured, the secured party could block the sale by electing
section 111 (b) treatment. Thus, the debtor is precluded from selling
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 11 U.S.C. § 363(o)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
247. Id. § 1111(b)(2) (1982).
248. Section 1129 sets out the requirements for the contents of the plan. Section
11 29(a)(7)(B) makes it clear that the plan need pay secured creditors only the present value of
the collateral. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
249. Id.
250. Id. § 1 124(3)(A). Of course, if the debtor were willing to pay the secured party the
full amount of its claim, the debtor could do so. The § 111 l(b) election precludes the elimina-
tion of a claim by payment at the beginning of the plan, the present value of the collateral.
Section 1129(a)(7)(B) only authorizes payments under the plan with interest. Id.
§ 1129(a)(7)(B).
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the collateral at the beginning of the plan and paying the proceeds to
the creditor. This preclusion has restricted some restructuring efforts.
There is no counterpart to section 1111 (b) in Chapter 12. There-
fore, if a farmer were in Chapter 12 and wanted to sell the equipment
and pay the undersecured secured party the proceeds from the sale, he
or she would be free to do so.25' This ability to sell collateral and pay
off creditors might free up some of the future income, and thus may
be a way of funding the farm. Other than this, Chapter 12 does not
seem to make credit raising any easier than it was in Chapter 11.
Under the heading "Post Confirmation Credit," the Conference
Report suggests that the key to credit in Chapter 12 is that under
section 1227(c) the property vesting in the debtor once the plan is
confirmed is free and clear of any claim of a creditor provided for in
the plan.252 The exception to this rule is in section 1225(a)(5)(B). 2 3
If a secured creditor has not accepted the plan, then in order to be
confirmed, the plan must allow the secured party to retain a lien on
the debtor's property and must pay to the secured creditor the present
value of the allowed amount of the secured claim.2 54 Section 506(a)
defines allowable secured claims as equal to the creditor's interest in
the estate's interest in property.255 In other words, a secured claim is
limited to the value of the collateral. Therefore, after confirmation,
the liens that existed prior to confirmation will remain undisturbed by
confirmation. Unless the debtor had assets free and clear before con-
firmation, the confirmation of the plan is not likely to make assets
available. Without equity to secure postpetition credit, the farmer
will have to rely on the limited "carrots" provided in section 364.
Apart from the elimination of section 111 (b) rights in Chapter
12, obtaining both pre and postconfirmation credit may prove to be as
difficult for farmers as it was in Chapter 11. This could prove to be
the Achilles heel to the usefulness of Chapter 12.
251. Section 1225(a)(5)(C) allows the debtor to require the creditor to accept the property
in exchange for the allowed secured claim. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(c) (Supp. IV 1986). This would
merely release the lien on the property. An undersecured creditor has an unsecured claim as
well, and the creditor would be entitled to whatever payments were being made on unsecured
debt.
252. H.R. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986) (reprinted in '1086 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5251-52); 11 U.S.C. § 1227(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
253. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
254. Id
255. Id. § 506(a) (1982).
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VI. TREATMENT OF SECURED AND UNSECURED INDEBTEDNESS
Many farmers have undersecured creditors. This is especially
true for farmland lenders since the price of farmland has fallen so
substantially. In 1984 farmland value declined twelve percent nation-
ally and twenty percent in the corn belt, lake states, and northern
plain.256 After peaking in 1981, land values have declined by nearly
fifty percent in Iowa and Nebraska, and by approximately forty per-
cent in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and Missouri.257 Chapter
12, like Chapter 11, allows the debtor to reduce the secured party's
secured claim to the value of his or her share of the collateral. 258 The
main difference between the two chapters is the elimination of section
1111 (b) creditor rights in Chapter 12. It has already been mentioned
that the elimination of section 1111(b) rights allows the Chapter 12
farmer to pay off the secured party by paying the value of the secured
party's interest in the collateral at the beginning of the plan.25 9 It may
also have another effect.
Under section 506(d) the debtor has the power to avoid liens to
the extent they are not allowed secured claims. 2 ° Allowed secured
claims are defined in section 506(a),26 t which states, "[a]n allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property ... is a secured claim
to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property ... 262 Assume that there are three mort-
gages on farmland that is currently worth $400,000. The debt of the
first mortgage is $250,000, the second, $100,000, and the third,
$150,000. The first two are fully secured, but the third is under-
secured. In Chapter 11, section 111 (b) would allow the third credi-
tor to elect treatment as fully secured.2 6 3 Section 1111 (b) overrides
section 506(a). 2 4 Therefore, the debtor could not avoid $100,000
worth of the third creditor's lien under section 506(d).26 5 The
256. Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms, January 1985, Agriculture Information Bulle-
tin No. 495, 2 (available from the Economic Research Service division of the United States
Department of Agriculture).
257. Id.
258. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
259. See supra note 251.
260. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (Supp. III 1985).
261. Id. § 506(a) (1982).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 111 (b)(2).
264. Id.
265. Once an undersecured creditor elects § 1 1ll(b) treatment, that creditor's allowed
claim is the full amount of the claim, even though the collateral is worth less. Section 506(d)
allows avoidance of a lien only to the extent that the lien secures a claim that is not an allowed
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debtor's advantage in avoiding $100,000 of the third mortgagee's lien
is that it allows the debtor to retain the benefit of the value of the land
while preventing the third mortgagee from benefiting from property
appreciation under the plan.
Since a section like section 1111 (b) is not part of Chapter 12, a
farmer can and should use section 506(d) to avoid the lien on any
unsecured part of a creditor's debt. Under the plan the farmer need
only pay the present value of the creditor's interest in the property. 266
In the hypothetical just discussed, creditor one would receive the
present value of $250,000, creditor two, the present value of $100,000,
and creditor three the present value of $50,000. One hundred thou-
sand dollars worth of the third creditor's lien can be avoided under
section 506(d), leaving the third mortgagee with a $100,000 unsecured
claim. If the farm land appreciates in value under the plan, the in-
crease in value goes to the farmer and not to the third mortgagee.
Since the secured creditor has no voting rights in Chapter 12, the
third creditor can not withhold his vote in an attempt to get the
farmer to pay more.
The length of a Chapter 12 plan cannot exceed five years.2 67 In
fact it may only last three years unless the court approves a four or
five year plan.2 68 If a farmer were forced to complete plan payments
to secured creditors by the end of a five year plan, very few farmers
could successfully reorganize in Chapter 12. However, section 1222,
which delineates what the plan must include, provides for the pay-
ment of secured debt over a period exceeding the period of the plan.26 9
It applies only to secured debt with an original term that extended
beyond the last date under the plan.27 °
The ability to scale down secured debt to the value of the collat-
eral is one of the bigger advantages of bankruptcy. The farmer had
this same right in Chapter 11,271 but as can be seen, there were a
secured claim. Section 111 (b) election should preclude § 506(d) avoidance. Id. §§ 111 (b),
506 (d).
266. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
267. Id. § 1222(c).
268. Id.
269. Id. § 1222(b)(9).
270. Id. § 1225(b)(5), (9).
271. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This is applicable in "cram down" situa-
tions. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) requires that parties receive at
least the amount they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Scaling down an under-
secured debt makes that creditor's claim impaired. Id. § 1124. Once a class of claims is im-
paired, then, if it does not accept the plan, the plan must be crammed down because
§ 1129(a)(8) has not been met. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
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number of impediments to obtaining a confirmed plan in Chapter 11.
A number of these impediments have been removed in Chapter 12, so
more farmers should be able to use this bankruptcy advantage.
The treatment of unsecured debt is where Chapter 12 has a big
advantage for the debtor over Chapter 11. Both Chapters 11 and 12
require that unsecured creditors receive only the amount they would
receive if the farm enterprise were liquidated in a Chapter 7 proceed-
272ing. 2 The difference lies in the right of unsecured parties to vote on
the plan in Chapter 11.273 Although a farmer may think he or she
does not have much unsecured debt, he or she should recall that an
undersecured creditor is in part an unsecured creditor. If these credi-
tors as a class do not approve the plan, the plan must meet the "cram
down" requirements of section 1129(b).2 74  As noted above, in a
"cram down", if an entity below the objecting creditor is to receive
anything under the plan, the plan must be "fair and equitable" and
the senior creditor must be paid in full. 275 The Ahlers decision, al-
lowing a farmer to retain property at the end of the plan equal to the
value of his or her labor, experience, and expertise, was a short lived
exception to this rule.27 6 The Supreme Court's reversal of Ahlers,
however, makes it clear that labor and experience can no longer be
used to meet the fair and equitable test.2 77
There is no "cram down" in Chapter 12 proceedings and no ab-
solute priority rule. Creditors, secured and unsecured, have no right
to vote on the plan. The farmer can keep farm assets, scale down
secured debt278 and pay unsecured creditors the amount they would
have received had the farm been liquidated in a Chapter 7.279 If the
farmer has few unencumbered, nonexempt assets, then the amount
that must be paid on unsecured debt under a confirmed plan will be
small.
There are a couple of exceptions to this basic picture. First, all
unsecured priority debt must be paid in full under the plan.28 ° Since
272. Id. § 1129(7)(A)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Id. § 1225(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
273. If an unsecured creditor class is paid less than the allowed amount of its claim, the
claims in the class are impaired. Id. § 1124 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A plan cannot be con-
firmed, absent a cram down, unless impaired classes have approved the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
274. Id. § 1129(b).
275. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). See supra discussion accompanying notes 152-54.
276. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, Norwest
Bank v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
277. Norwest Bank v. Ablers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
279. Id. § 1225(a)(4).
280. Id. § 1222(a)(2).
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the plan should be confirmed relatively quickly, administrative ex-
penses, which have first priority, 8 should not be high.28 2 The second
priority applies only in involuntary bankruptcies,283 and farmers can-
not be involuntarily brought into bankruptcy.28 4 If the farmer had no
employees, there will be no third or fourth priorities. 285 The fifth and
sixth priorities would also be inapplicable. 286 The main priority ex-
pense, if there are any, could be section 507(a)(7) taxes. 287 These are
primarily prepetition taxes ranging from income,288 excise,28 9 and
property taxes290 to employee taxes.29 ' Depending on the situation
before bankruptcy, these taxes could be substantial, and they must be
paid in full under the plan along with any other priority claim. 292 All
priority claims can be paid by deferred payments under the plan.293
The second exception applies if a creditor objects to the plan.294
If a creditor objects to the plan, section 1225(b) requires the farmer to
devote all disposable income during the plan period to payments
under the plan.295  Thus, if disposable income allows greater pay-
ments to creditors than those called for under the plan, unsecured
creditors would be paid more. Disposable income is defined as in-
come not reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the
debtor and his or her dependents and income not reasonably neces-
sary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of the debtor's
281. Administrative expenses must be incurred by the estate. Id. § 503(b) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
282. Id. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
283. Id. § 507(a)( 2) (1982). This refers to section 502(f) claims. These are claims in an
involuntary case that arise between the filing of the petition and the order of relief or the
appointment of a trustee, whichever occurs first. Id. § 502(f).
284. Id. § 303(a).
285. The third priority items are wage claims up to $2,000. Id. § 507(a)(3) (1982 & Supp.
Il1 1985). The fourth priority claims are for unpaid contributions to an employee benefit plan.
These too can be for $2,000 per individual, but subtracted from this sum are certain amounts
including amounts paid out in wage claims. Id. § 507(a)(4).
286. The fifth priority is given to farmers and fishermen whose farm products or fish are
being claimed by a bankrupt storage facility. Id § 507(a)(5) (Supp. III 1985). This too, is
limited to $2,000. The sixth priority is given for deposits made for the purchase or lease of
property or the purchase of services. Both the property and services are limited to consumer
property and services. This priority is limited to $900 per individual. Id. § 507(a)(6).
287. Id. § 507(a)(7).
288. Id. § 507(a)(7)(A).
289. Id. § 507(a)(7)(E).
290. Id. § 507(a)(7)(B).
291. Id. § 507(a)(7)(C), (D).
292. Id. § 1222(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
293. Id.
294. Id. § 1225(b).
295. Id.
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business.2 96 The Conference Report recognizes that in addition to the
farm enterprise, farmers may have a minor business not directly re-
lated to the farming operation.2 97 The Report states that "[t]he con-
ferees intend that the term 'debtor's business' in section 1225 include
such businesses. ' 298 This allows the farmer to arrive at disposable
income by deducting the expenses reasonably necessary for the opera-
tion of the minor business from gross income.
The requirement that disposable income be paid out under the
plan should not be a problem for farmers. It was added to Chapter 13
in 1984 to curb perceived abuses. 299 Before it was added, the statute
allowed individuals with relatively high incomes to pay only a small
part of unsecured debt.3" The disposable income requirement was
designed to prohibit this inequity.
VII. CURING DEFAULT
One of the advantages of filing either in Chapter 11 or 12 is the
ability to cure defaults.3"1 In Chapter 11, sections 1123(a)(5) and (6)
allow the plan to provide for the cure or waiver of any default.30 2
Since the plan must be approved by creditors or meet the "cram
down" requirements, the debtor's freedom to waive defaults is re-
stricted. Since creditors have no approval rights in Chapter 12, the
constraints to waiver of defaults do not exist in Chapter 12. It should
be noted that Chapter 12's statutory language is different. Section
1222(b)(3) provides for the curing or waiving of any default.30 3 How-
ever, section 1222(b)(5) provides for "the curing of any default within
a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last
payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the
plan is due. ' ' 3° Since no plan may continue more than five years, this
section would apply to any debt payments under the plan which fall
within the period of the plan and which extend beyond five years.
There is no provision allowing waiver of these defaults.
296. Id. § 1225(b)(2).
297. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
298. Id.
299. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 353, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 317, 98 Stat. 356 (1984).
300. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
301. Id. § 1123(a)(5), (6) (1982); Id. § 1222(b)(3), (5) (Supp. IV 1986).
302. Id. § 1123(a)(5), (6) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
303. Id. § 1222(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
304. Id. § 1222(b)(5).
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Even if a debt is in default when a bankruptcy petition is filed
and even if the loan has been accelerated and is in foreclosure when
bankruptcy is filed, the Chapter 12 debtor can deaccelerate the debt
and cure the default by making payments while the case is pending.3"'
Since secured debt can be modified, the payment schedule on this debt
can be set in the plan. If the last payment on any debt is after the last
payment under the plan, then defaults must be cured within a reason-
able time by making payments along with regular plan payments.30 6
VIII. DISCHARGE
In Chapter 11 it is the confirmation of the plan that triggers the
discharge.30 7 Since the discharge applies to all debts that arise prior
to the date of confirmation,3"8 not only prepetition debts but debts
that arise after the petition but prior to confirmation are subject to
discharge. The inclusion of postpetition claims is not unfair to these
claimants. For the most part, postpetition claims will be administra-
tive expenses. In a Chapter 11 case, administrative expenses must be
paid in full upon plan confirmation. 3°  There are a few exceptions to
this Chapter 11 discharge. First, an individual is not discharged from
section 523 claims.310 Second, if the plan calls for a liquidation and
the debtor does not engage in business after confirmation, the debtor
will be denied a discharge if the discharge would have been denied
under section 727(a). 31 1 For example, partnerships and corporations
which are barred from discharge under section 727(a) would be
barred from discharge in Chapter 11.312 An individual who would
have been barred from discharge under one of the other subsections of
section 727(a) is also barred from discharge.313 Third, the plan or
305. Similar language exists for Chapter 13 proceedings. The main difference is that sec-
tion 1322(b)(2) precludes modification of the rights of home mortgagees. Id § 1322(b)(2)
(Supp. III 1985). This complicates the Chapter 13 picture somewhat. Despite § 1322(b)(2),
courts have allowed the plan to cure defaults, including deaccelerating debt, even on home
mortgages. Since § 1222(b)(5) has no such limitation it should be allowed to deaccelerate
debts. Id. § 1222(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
306. Id. § 1222(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
307. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1982).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
310. Id. § 1141(d)(2) (1982).
311. Id. § 1141(d)(3). Section 727(a) sets out situations in which the debtor is barred from
discharge completely. One of these is where the debtor has received a discharge in Chapters 7
or 11 within the previous six years. Id. § 727(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
312. Id. § 727(a)(1) (1982).
313. Id. § 727(a)(l)-(10) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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order of confirmation can condition or restrict a discharge.314 Other
than these three exceptions, the discharge in Chapter 11 is a broad
one.
The discharge rules in Chapter 12 are primarily based on Chap-
ter 13 with some changes.315 As is the case in section 1328, there are
two types of discharges in Chapter 12. Once the farmer makes all of
the payments under the plan, he or she will be entitled to a discharge
under section 1228(a).3 16 Unlike the Chapter 11 discharge, the sec-
tion 1228(a) discharge only occurs after all plan payments have been
made. There are several types of debts that are excepted from the
section 1228(a) discharge. First are long term debts, the final pay-
ment on which will take place after the last payment under the
plan. 317 These are debts included in section 1222(b)(5) of the new
chapter.318 Since many farm debts are long term debts which will fall
under section 1222(b)(5), the section 1228(a) broad discharge will not
apply to many debts, even though the farmer has made all the pay-
ments under the plan.
The statute is confusing as to the second type of debt not subject
to discharge. Section 1228(a)(1) refers to section 1222(b)(10) which
covers the vesting of property of the estate in the debtor.31 9 It makes
no sense for section 1228(a)(1) to preclude from discharge the vesting
of property in the debtor. No doubt Congress meant to include sec-
tion 1222(b)(9) debts as nondischargeable debts, and not section
1222(b)(10) debts.32 ° Subsection (b)(9) debts are long term secured
debts for which payment is due after plan payments have ended.321
Since the secured party will not have received the value of the collat-
eral when the plan payments terminate, these debts should be nondis-
chargeable. Therefore, the debt should not be subject to discharge.
314. Id. § 1141(d)(1) (1982).
315. Id. § 1328 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) contains the discharge rules for Chapter 13. Id.
§ 1228 (Supp. IV 1986) contains the discharge rules for Chapter 12.
316. Id. § 1228(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
317. Id. § 1228(a)(1).
318. Id. § 1222(b)(5).
319. Id. § 1228(a)(1). Section 1222(b)(10) allows the plan to: "provide for the vesting of
property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in any
other entity ...." Id. § 1222(b)(10).
320. Section 1222(b)(9) allows the plan to "provide for payment of allowed secured claims
consistent with section 1225(a)(5) of this title, over a period exceeding the period permitted
under section 1222(c) ...." Id. § 1222(b)(9). Section 1222(b)(5) allows the curing of defaults
on long term indebtedness. Id. § 1222(b)(5). Section 1222(c) states that except as provided in
subsections (b)(5) and (b)(9), plan payments cannot continue past the length of the plan. This
is a standard three years, unless the court allows a longer period up to five years. Id. § 1222(c).
321. Id. § 1222(b)(9).
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This is in fact what section 1328(a)(1) does in Chapter 13.322 Since
section 1228 seems to be modeled on section 1328, a court should find
no difficulty in concluding that Congress meant to include section
1222(b)(9) debts as nondischargeable. The reference to section
1222(b)(10) makes no sense, and a technical corrections bill should
correct this language.
The last type of debt not discharged under section 1228(a) is sec-
tion 523(a) debt.323 This is a major difference between a Chapter 12
and a Chapter 13 discharge.324 In Chapter 13, alimony and child sup-
port found in section 523(a)(5) 325 are the only debts which are not
discharged upon completion of the Chapter 13 plan payments.326 All
otherwise nondischargeable debts are discharged under section
1328(a).3 27 In contrast, section 1228(a) excepts all nondischargeable
328debts from the Chapter 12 discharge, so a farmer with any section
523 nondischargeable debt will not be able to discharge that debt in
Chapter 12.
Nondischargeable debts cover a wide range of debts. One that
may appear frequently in a farm situation is a conversion claim.329
Conversion claims occur when a farmer sells property that is collat-
eral for a loan and the sale is in violation of the security agreement.3
322. Id. § 1328(a)(1) (1982) merely refers to § 1322(b)(5) which is the counterpart of
§ 1222(b)(5) on curing defaults on long term debt. Section 1322 has no subsection like
1222(b)(9).
323. Id § 1228(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
324. Id. § 1328(a)(2) (Supp. 1982).
325. Id. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
326. Id § 1328(a)(2) (1982).
327. Id. § 1328(a). Arguments have been made that unsecured creditors with § 523(a)
nondischargeable debts should receive more under a Chapter 13 plan than they would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. Section 1325(a)(4) requires a Chapter 13 plan
to pay unsecured creditors the amount they would have received, had the estate of the debtor
been liquidated in Chapter 7. The creditors argued that because their debts were nondis-
chargeable in Chapter 7, they could have collected from the debtor after bankruptcy. This,
they argued, would give them more than they would receive from the liquidation of the
debtor's property. This argument has not found favor with the courts. See, e.g., In re Rim-
gale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Syrus, 12 Bankr. 605, 608 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
328. 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 523(a) was also amended to make it
clear that a § 1228 discharge does not discharge § 523 debts. Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 257(n),
100 Stat. 3088, 3115 (1986).
329. A conversion is a wrongful appropriation of someone else's property. The unauthor-
ized transfer of someone else's property is a common form of conversion. PROSSER & KEE-
TON, TORTS, § 15, at 96-98 (5th Ed. 1984).
330. See, e.g., In re Adametz, 53 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); In re Pommerer, 10
Bankr. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In re McCloud, 7 Bankr. 819, 822-26 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1980).
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Section 523 does not specifically list conversion claims, but it does
include claims for willful, malicious injury. Since a conversion is
an intentional tort, willfulness is easily shown. 332 However, the courts
have disagreed over what constitutes a malicious injury.
The courts basically take three approaches. The one that is most
difficult to prove and is therefore the best for the farmer, requires
proof that the farmer intended to hurt the secured party by the sale.333
The last two approaches start out the same. They find the transfer to
be malicious if the debtor knew that the sale would harm another.3 3 4
Some courts say that maliciousness will be presumed if the debtor has
read the security agreement or the debtor is in business. 3" One court
has even presumed such knowledge by the fact that the consumer
debtor had entered into numerous secured transactions. 36 A farmer
could easily fall under the businessman category and therefore be pre-
sumed to have known the sale was in violation of the security agree-
ment. Even if courts do not put farmers in the category of
businessmen, they would fall under the category of a debtor who had
entered into many secured transactions. Thus, farmers are at risk of
having nondischargeable claims. Despite this risk, there are a number
of cases that hold that even though a technical conversion of farm
property has taken place, there is no maliciousness. 37 Many of the
farming cases that find maliciousness have special circumstances. 3
However, if a farmer has a nondischargeable debt, a Chapter 13 filing
should be considered if possible.
331. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982).
332. See, e.g., In re Ries, 22 Bankr. 343, 346 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Giantvalley,
14 Bankr. 457, 458 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); In re Meyer, 7 Bankr. 932, 933 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981); In re McCloud, 7 Bankr. 819, 825-26 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
333. See, e.g., In re Gentis, 10 Bankr. 209, 213 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re McLaughlin,
14 Bankr. 773 (Bankr. D. Ga. 1981); In re Nelson, 10 Bankr. 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re
Harris, 8 Bankr. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Hawkins, 6 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1980) (continuation of loan payments); In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513, 517 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1980) (selling to raise money for living purposes shown no intent to harm).
334. See, e.g., In re Adametz, 53 Bankr. 299, 302-05 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); In re Dono-
frio, 19 Bankr. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Giantvalley, 14 Bankr. 457, 458 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1981); In re McCloud, 7 Bankr. 819, 825-26 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
335. See, e.g., In re Donny, 19 Bankr. 354, 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Ricketts, 16
Bankr. 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
336. See In re Pies, 22 Bankr. 343, 348 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).
337. See, e.g., In re Cline, 52 Bankr. 301 (Bankr. W.D. Ken. 1985); In re Nelson, 67 Bankr.
491 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Johnson, 42 Bankr. 755 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); In re
Dino, 17 Bankr. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Harris, 8 Bankr. 93, 94 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980).
338. In re Boren, 47 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (misrepresentation); In re Simp-
son, 29 Bankr. 202, 213 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (sale after appointment of receiver); In re
Donny, 19 Bankr. 354 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (farmer had no ownership interest in cattle sold).
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The other type of discharge provided in section 1228 is what
Chapter 13 terms a hardship discharge.3 39 A debtor may be eligible
for a hardship discharge when the debtor cannot complete payments
under the plan, and such inability is due to circumstances for which
the debtor should not be held accountable. 34  A hardship discharge
also requires that the amount the creditors actually received under the
plan is at least equal to the amount they would have received had the
debtor's property been liquidated in a Chapter 7 proceeding.
Lastly, the debtor must show that modification of the plan under sec-
tion 1229 would not be practicable.342
This hardship discharge does not discharge sections 1222(b)(5)
and (10) debts or section 523(a) nondischargeable debts.343 This
raises the question of how the hardship discharge differs from what
should be a broader discharge upon completion of plan payments.
Section 1228(a) discharges all debts "provided for by the plan allowed
under section 503 ... or disallowed under section 502 .... "34 Sec-
tion 1228(b) on the other hand discharges "all unsecured debts pro-
vided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 . . . . " The
first difference is clear: section 1228(b) only discharges unsecured
debt, whereas section 1228(a) discharges both secured and unsecured
debt.346 This makes sense because in the case of a hardship discharge,
secured parties will not have received what they would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Therefore, these debts should not be dis-
charged. The second difference, the reference in section 1228(a) to
debts allowed under section 503, is unclear.347 Section 503 does not
allow or disallow debts,348 but it sets out what claims are to be treated
as administrative claims.349 Thus, a good argument can be made that
Congress meant to refer to section 502 not section 503. Court gui-
dance is needed on this point since the Conference Report does not
address it.
If a farmer cannot complete the payments called for by the plan,
339. 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
340. Id. § 1228(b)(1).
341. Id. § 1228(b)(2).
342. Id. § 1228(b)(3).
343. Id. § 1228(c).
344. Id. § 1228(a).
345. Id. § 1228(c).
346. Id. § 1228(a), (b).
347. Id. § 1228(a).
348. Id. § 503 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
349. Id.
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he or she should try for a hardship discharge.35° If the farmer can
qualify, at least unsecured creditors' debts will be discharged.
IX. ROLE OF A TRUSTEE
The one disadvantage readily apparent under a Chapter 12 pro-
ceeding, as opposed to a Chapter 11 proceeding, is the role of the
trustee and the trustee's fee. A trustee is not normally appointed in a
Chapter 11 proceeding.35' Trustees are regularly appointed in Chap-
ter 13 proceedings, and will also be appointed in Chapter 12 pro-
ceedings. 353 The Chapter 12 trustee does not manage the farm.354 He
or she has administrative duties.355 It should be noted, however, that
the farmer can be removed from the position of debtor in possession if
a court finds that the debtor committed fraud, acted dishonestly, or
incompetently or grossly mismanaged the farm's affairs either before
350. Id. § 1228(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
351. Section 1104 sets out the grounds for appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding. Id. § 1104 (1982). Grounds include fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by the current management. The court may order the
appointment of a trustee upon a finding that such would be in the interest of creditors and
equity holders. Section 1107 gives the debtor in possession, absent the appointment of a
trustee, most of the rights of a trustee. Id. § 1107(a) (Supp. III 1985).
352. Id. § 1302 (1982) requires the appointment of a trustee in Chapter 13 cases.
353. Id. § 1202(a) (Supp. IV 1986) states:
(a) If the United States trustee has appointed an individual under section
586(b) of title 28 to serve as standing trustee in cases under this chapter and if such
individual qualifies as a trustee under section 322 of this title, then such individual
shall serve as trustee in any case filed under this chapter. Otherwise, the United
States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person to serve as trustee in the case or
the United States trustee may serve as trustee in the case if necessary.
354. 11 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (Supp. IV 1986) gives the trustee administrative duties. It states:
(b) The trustee shall-
(1) perform the duties specified in sections 704(2), 704(3), 704(5), 704(6),
704(7) and 704(9) of this title;
(2) perform the duties specified in section 1106(a)(3) and 1106(a)(4) of this
title if the court, for cause and on request of a party in interest, the trustee, or the
United States trustee, so orders;
(3) appear and be heard at any hearing that concerns-
(A) the value of property subject to a lien;
(B) confirmation of a plan;
(C) modification of the plan after confirmation; or
(D) the sale of property of the estate;
(4) ensure that the debtor commences making timely payments required by a
confirmed plan; and
(5) if the debtor ceases to be a debtor in possession, perform the duties speci-
fied in sections 704(8), 1106(a)(1), 1106(a)(2), 1106(a)(6), 1106(a)(7) and 1203.
Id.
355. Id.
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or after the commencement of the case.356
Since the typical Chapter 12 trustee will not manage the farm,
his or her duties are limited to accounting for property received, en-
suring the debtor has performed as intended under section 521(2)(B),
examining proof of claims and objecting to improper ones, opposing
the discharge of the debtor if advisable, appearing at hearings, ensur-
ing that the debtor commences making timely payments under a con-
firmed plan and making payments to creditors under the plan unless
the plan provides otherwise.3 57 If the court for cause orders, the
trustee is also empowered to investigate the acts, conduct, assets, lia-
bilities, and financial condition of the debtor; the operation of the
debtor's business; the desirability of continuing the business; and to
make a report on the investigation. 58
The trustee's fee in a Chapter 12 should be the same as it would
be in a Chapter 13 proceeding. 359 The amount of the trustee's fee that
is paid out under the plan may depend on the type of trustee involved
in the case. The United States trustee is empowered to appoint stand-
ing trustees for the judicial region if the number of Chapter 12 cases
justifies such appointment.3 ° If a standing trustee is appointed for
Chapter 12 cases in that region, the statute requires that a portion of
that standing trustee's compensation be taken from plan payments.6
The fee is deducted from each disbursement made under the plan.36 2
The maximum that can be taken from plan payments is ten percent of
the first $450,000 in payments made under a family farmer plan.36 3
After plan payments exceed $450,000, three percent is the maximum
percentage that can be taken from payments. 3 4 The percentages are
based on the maximal annual compensation fixed for such trustee and
356. Id. § 1204(a). Unlike 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982), § 1204(a) does not include as a ground
for removal, the best interests of creditors and equity holders.
357. 11 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (Supp. IV 1986) sets out many of these duties. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (Supp. IV 1986) states: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, the trustee shall make payments to creditors under the plan."
358. 11 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) sets out as part of the trustee's duties in a
Chapter 12 an obligation to perform the duties set out in subsections 1106(a)(3), (4) if the
court for cause so orders. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (1982) sets out the duty of the trustee to
investigate. 11 U.S.C. § 1 106(a)(4) (1982) requires the trustee to file a timely report of his or
her investigation.
359. This is because compensation for the trustee in both chapters is governed by I I U.S.C.
§ 326(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
360. Id. § 586(b).
361. Id. § 586(e)(1)(B)(ii).
362. Id. § 586(e)(2).
363. Id. § 586(e)(l)(B)(ii)(I).
364. Id. § 586(e)(l)(B)(ii)(II).
1988-89]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:49
the actual, necessary expenses incurred by the individual serving as
standing trustee.365 The Attorney General, not the court, fixes the
percentages.366
An issue arose in the pilot United States trustee districts, as to
whether the trustee's fees in individual Chapter 13 cases could be re-
duced by the court if the services of the trustee did not justify the
fixed percentage award.367 The litigation arose in Rhode Island. The
bankruptcy court ruled that judges retained the power to lower
Rhode Island's ten percent fee, when the size of the payments made
the fee too large when compared with work performed.368 At issue
was the statutory language in title 28, section 586(e) and section
15326 of the Bankruptcy Code. 369 The bankruptcy court noted that if
plan payments were large, the ten percent fee would over compensate
the trustee for the actual time spent on the case, whereas in nonpilot
365. Id. § 586(e)(1).
366. Id.
367. See, e.g., In re Savage, 67 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Tartaglia, 61 Bankr.
439 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Sousa, 46 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985). Note, all of these
cases are from the same judicial district in Rhode Island. It had a pilot United States Trustee
Program.
A number of earlier court decisions allowed the court to reduce the standing trustee's fee.
In In re Eaton, I Bankr. 433 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1979), a business was involved in a Chapter 13
proceeding. The monthly plan payments were $6,000, and the court found that allowing the
nine percent standing trustee fee would be unconscionable. Id. The court held that it had the
power to reduce the fee if the fee generated by the standard percentage was too large. Id. at
434. The Fifth Circuit in In re Foster, 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982), relied on Eaton and
suggested that the bankruptcy court should reduce the percentage fee if the debtor acts as
disbursement agent, since the trustee would perform fewer services. Id. at 491-92.
These cases can be distinguished because they did not involve pilot United States Trustee
Districts. The statutory language before the Eaton and Foster courts was in § 1302(e) which
authorized the court to appoint standing trustees and to set the standing trustee's fees. 11
U.S.C. § 1302(e) (1982). In pilot districts the statutory fee was fixed under § 586(e) of title 28
in which the Attorney General, not the court, was authorized to set the standing trustee's fee.
28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1982). This was the statute before the Savage court. The Bankruptcy
Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 repealed the pilot
districts and set up United States Trustees across the country. Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 231, 100
Stat. 3088, 3103 (1986). The language relied on by the Eaton and Foster courts in section
1302(e) was also repealed. Id. § 228(2). Now, all standing trustees are appointed by the
United States Trustees, not the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Now, § 586 of
title 28 fixes the fee for standing trustees in all Chapter 12 and 13 cases. Id. § 586(e). It is the
Attorney General, in consultation with the United States trustee who appointed the standing
trustee, who is empowered to set the percentage fee. Id. The courts are no longer involved, so
a much better argument can be made that courts now have no power to adjust the fixed per-
centage fee.
368. See In re Tartaglia, 61 Bankr. 439 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Sousa, 46 Bankr. 343
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1985).
369. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 15326 (1982).
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districts, fees would be based on work done.37° It also stressed that if
courts could not adjust the fees of standing trustees then different fees
would be taken depending on the type of trustee involved. 37'
In In re Savage372 the debtor sold real estate and made enough
money to make all the payments called for in the plan in one pay-
ment. The trustee withheld approximately $6,000 as his statutory
percentage fee,373 but the bankruptcy court reduced the fee.374 The
Savage decision was appealed to the district court and reversed.375
The language involved in Savage is the same in relevant aspects to the
language controlling the issue for Chapter 12 cases.3 76 Central to the
issue is the fact that section 326(b) (section 15326 in Savage), states
that the "court may not allow compensation for services or reim-
bursement of expenses of the United States trustee or of a standing
trustee appointed under section 586(b) of Title 28 ... 37 Section
586(e) gives the Attorney General the power to fix the salary of stand-
ing trustees appointed under section 586(b). 378 This fee is to be set at
a governmental employees grade GS-16 step 1 level and a percentage
fee "based on such maximum annual compensation and the actual,
necessary expenses incurred by such individual as standing
trustee. ' 379 The district court in Savage held that the standing trustee
fee was to be spread over all of the Chapter 13 cases handled by the
United States trustee.3"0 The court noted that this meant there may
be more paid by one debtor and less paid by another. 38 ' However, the
court also noted a standing trustee's difficulty in keeping time records
for all the cases in which he or she was involved.38 2 If this decision
370. In re Sousa, 46 Bankr. 343, 344-45 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985).
371. Id.
372. 67 Bankr. 700, 701 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986).
373. Id.
374. In re Savage, 60 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. D.R.I.), rev'd 67 Bankr. 700 (D.R.I. 1986).
375. Id.
376. The statutory language at issue in Savage was in § 15326 of title 11 and § 586(e) of
title 28. 11 U.S.C. § 15326 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1982). The language in § 15326 is now
the language in 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (Supp. IV 1987) with some minor changes, including the
reference to the new Chapter 12. Section 15326, as does § 326(b), stated that the court cannot
award a trustee fee for a trustee appointed under § 586(b) of title 28. 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). United States trustees appoint trustees under § 586(b) as did the pilot
United States trustees. Id. The fee for all trustees appointed pursuant to § 586(b) is set out in
§ 586(e). Id. § 586(e).
377. 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
378. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
379. Id.
380. In re Savage, 67 Bankr. 700, 707 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986).
381. Id. at 706-07.
382. Id. at 707.
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stands, the fee will not be adjustable per case, but if a large number of
cases with substantial payments are involved in Chapter 12, in any
region, then the fee should be lower than the ten percent maximum.
If a standing trustee has not been appointed in the judicial re-
gion, under section 586(b), the United States trustee is empowered to
appoint a trustee for a particular Chapter 12 case.383 The compensa-
tion for this type of trustee is structured differently. 38  Here, the fees
are expenses under section 330(a) of the Code. Section 330(a) ex-
penses are made administrative expenses by section 503(b)(2).38 5 Sec-
tion 1226(b) specifies that administrative expenses are to be paid
before or at the time of each payment to creditors under the plan.386
This fee is based on the actual, necessary services and expenses, 38 7 but
section 326(b) limits the fee to a maximum of five percent of plan
payments.38 8
Either fee could be a significant amount, and if this is the case,
the farmer may want to keep certain payments outside of the plan.
The standing trustee fees are authorized to be taken from all pay-
ments received by the trustee.389  The nonstanding trustee's fee is
based on actual services rendered and will be paid as an administra-
tive expense.3ag Under Chapter 13, some courts have recognized ways
of avoiding or at least reducing the trustee's fees. If the district
court's opinion in the Savage case is upheld, the first approach would
merely reduce the fee in cases that do not involve a standing trustee.
Chapter 13 and 12 trustees are authorized to make the plan payments
unless the plan specifies otherwise. 391 In Foster v. Heitkamp 392 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that a
Chapter 13 debtor could elect to make certain payments himself or
herself instead of the trustee making the payments.393 The debtor in
383. 11 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
384. 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (Supp. IV 1986) sets the fee for trustees appointed under § 1202(a).
Id. § 1202(a).
385. The fees for trustees appointed under § 1202(a) and set by § 326(b) are made adminis-
trative expenses by inclusion in § 330. Id. § 330 (Supp. III 1985). Section 326(b) specially
refers to § 330. Id. § 326(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 330 compensation claims are treated as
administrative claims by their inclusion in § 503(b)(2). Id. § 1202(a) (Supp. IV 1986); Id
§ 503(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
386. Id § 1226(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
387. Id. § 330(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
388. Id. § 326(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
389. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
390. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
391. Id. § 1226(c) (Supp. IV 1986); Id. § 1326(c) (Supp. III 1985).
392. 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982).
393. Id. at 486-88.
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Foster wished to act as disbursement agent for his mortgage pay-
ment. 94 The court held that the trustee's fee would still be taken
from these payments but that the fee should be reduced since the
trustee's fee was based on the amount of time expended on the case.3 95
If courts have no authority to lower a standing trustee's fee, and
it is not based on the amount of work in a particular case, a debtor
will not reduce the trustee's fee by acting as disbursement agent.
However, a second way of eliminating the percentage fee on particu-
lar payments may work against the standing trustee.
The Foster court also addressed the issue of when, if ever, the
debtor may treat some payments as outside of the plan and outside of
the trustee's fee on such payments.396 The Foster court held that a
bankruptcy judge could allow payments outside the plan but only if
the debtor was not paying off arrearages under the plan.3 9 7 Relying
on section 1322(b)(5), the court noted that the statute provided for
paying off a default while making regular payments on long term in-
debtedness.3 98 The court concluded that section 1322(b)(5) required
that debt payments be made inside of the plan if arrearages were being
paid under the plan.3 99 Moreover, the court noted that a bankruptcy
court could allow a payment outside the plan only if the judge deter-
mined that the plan was still feasible.' Factors relevant in allowing
the debtor to act as disbursement agent are whether the debtor will
make the payments and make them on time as well as how the pay-
ments will affect the debtor's ability to make plan payments." 1 The
Foster analysis has been followed by Chapter 12 cases.4 2
Since many farmers will have long term debt, the issue arises
whether they will be able to treat some of these payments outside of
the plan to avoid the trustee's percentage fee. Even if the plan is not
paying arrearages on this debt under section 1222(b)(5), a modifica-
tion of secured debt under section 1222(b)(2) may preclude treatment
of the debt outside of the plan.1 3 However, the scaling down of se-
cured debt under section 506(a) to the value of the collateral should
394. Id.
395. Id. at 491.
396. Id. at 488-90.
397. Id. at 490.
398. Id. at 489.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 489-90.
401. Id. at 486-87.
402. See, e.g., In re Hildebrandt, 79 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Lenz, 74
Bankr. 413 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
403. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2), (5) (Supp. IV 1986).
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not be a modification under section 1222(b)(2). 4 Section 1222(b)
talks in terms of modifying a secured claim,4°5 and section 506(a)
states that an allowed claim is a secured claim to the extent of the
creditor's interest in the property. °6 Thus, scaling down secured debt
should not be a modification under section 1222(b).
There are two cases involving changes in the interest rate, the
length of the loan, and the payment schedule that hold that despite
these modifications the debts can be paid outside of the plan to avoid
the payment of a trustee's fee on these amounts." 7 In re Land is the
better reasoned case. The Land court focuses on language in section
586(e)(2). °8 This language allows the trustee to collect the fee "from
all payments received by [the trustee] under plans." 9 The court con-
cluded that once payments were made directly to the creditor they
were no longer received by the trustee and therefore no fee could be
exacted from them.4 10 Whether other courts accept this line of rea-
soning remains to be seen.
Needless to say, a number of issues in this area need to be re-
solved. But, if a farmer does not need to use the plan to cure a default
on long term indebtedness, or a court follows the Land court, the
farmer should consider trying to treat such payments outside of the
plan if the trustee's percentage fee can be reduced. Since these claims
are long term debts, and long term debts are excepted from the Chap-
ter 12 discharge,4"1 paying the claim outside of bankruptcy should not
affect the discharge under the plan.4"2
X. CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN
Section 1225 governs the confirmation of a Chapter 12 plan,4"3
and it states that a plan shall be approved by a court if six require-
ments have been met.41 4 A number of these have already been men-
404. Id. § 506(a) (1982).
405. Id. § 1222(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) states "the plan may... modify the rights of holders
of secured claims ......
406. Id. § 506(a) (1982).
407. In re Land, 82 Bankr. 572 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Erickson Partnership, 77
Bankr. 738 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
408. Land, 82 Bankr. at 579-80.
409. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
410. Land, 82 Bankr. at 579-80.
411. Even if plan payments are completed, long term debt is not discharged. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1228(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
412. Id.
413. Id. § 1225.
414. Id. § 1225(a).
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tioned. The plan must provide for payment of a value as of the
effective date of the plan that at least equals what unsecured creditors
would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation held on
the same date.4" 5 The amount paid here will depend on the value of
the farmer's unencumbered, nonexempt assets. Secured creditors can
be treated one of three ways.416 The debtor might surrender the col-
lateral to the secured party.41 7 If the farmer wishes to keep the prop-
erty then he must do one of two things. The farmer can get the
secured party to agree to a particular treatment.418 If the secured
party does not give consent, however, the plan must provide for the
retention of the secured party's lien41 9 and must pay the secured party
an amount at least equal to the allowed amount of its claim as of the
effective date of the plan.42° Recall that 506(a) defines an allowed
secured claim, and it is limited to the value of the collateral. 421 There-
fore, the plan must propose to pay unsecured creditors what a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation would have paid them plus interest and must pay
secured creditors the value of their collateral plus interest.
In addition, section 1225 requires the plan to have been made in
good faith and in compliance with other code sections.422 These re-
quirements should cause no problems for farmers. All court fees must
also be paid before confirmation.423 This too should not be hard to
do. The last of the requirements may cause the greatest difficulty.
The court must find that the debtor will be able to make the payments
under the plan and comply with the plan.424 If after scaling down the
debt the plan is still not feasible, the farmer should consider a Chapter
7 conversion.
If a creditor objects, the plan must show that all disposable in-
come is being paid under the plan.425 As discussed, disposable income
is income received, minus sums reasonably necessary to support the
debtor or any dependents.426 It does not include sums reasonably
necessary for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continua-
415. Id. § 1225(a)(4).
416. Id. § 1225(a)(5).
417. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(C).
418. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(A).
419. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(i).
420. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii).
421. Id. § 506(a) (1982).
422. Id. § 1225(a)(1), (3) (Supp. IV 1986).
423. Id. § 1225(a)(2).
424. Id. § 1225(a)(6).
425. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B).
426. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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tion, preservation, and operation of the debtor's business.427 Thus, for
a three to five year period the financial flow of the farm enterprise will
be controlled by the plan.428 Once the plan meets these requirements
the court must confirm it, and a confirmed plan binds the debtor and
the creditors whether they agreed to the plan or not.4 2 9
XI. CONCLUSION
As can be seen, Chapter 12, with no right to vote for creditors
has many advantages over Chapter I I for a farm debtor. With no
absolute priority rule and no lost opportunity costs, confirmation of a
plan should be easier in Chapter 12 than it was in Chapter 11. The
biggest question is post filing credit. Even if a farmer does not need
operating capital before confirmation, credit will be needed after con-
firmation. At this point, the credit community is unsettled. Upon
reflection, they may find that Chapter 12 is no worse than a liquida-
tion and may be better. If postpetition credit is available, Chapter 12
should help farmers stay in business. How many will be helped re-
mains to be seen.
427. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(B).
428. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (Supp. IV 1986) states: '[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b),
the court shall confirm a plan if ... 
429. Id. § 1227(a).
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